In cryptocurrencies, the block reward is meant to serve as the incentive mechanism for miners to commit resources to create blocks and in effect secure the system. Existing systems primarily divide the reward in proportion to expended resources and follow one of two static models for total block reward: (i) a fixed reward for each block (e.g., Ethereum), or (ii) one where the block reward halves every set number of blocks (e.g., the Bitcoin model of halving roughly every 4 years) but otherwise remains fixed between halvings. In recent work, a game-theoretic analysis of the static model under asymmetric miner costs showed that an equilibrium always exists and is unique. Their analysis also reveals how asymmetric costs can lead to large-scale centralization in blockchain mining, a phenomenon that has been observed in Bitcoin and Ethereum and highlighted by other studies. In this work we introduce a novel family of mining reward functions, HaPPY-Mine (HAsh-Pegged Proportional Yield), which peg the value of the reward to the hashrate of the system, decreasing the reward as the hashrate increases. HaPPY-Mine distributes rewards in proportion to expended hashrate and inherits the safety properties of the generalized proportional reward function. We study HaPPY-Mine under a heterogeneous miner cost model and show that an equilibrium always exists with a unique set of miner participants and a unique total hashrate. Significantly, we prove that a HaPPY-Mine equilibrium is more decentralized than the static model equilibrium under a set of metrics including number of mining participants and hashrate distribution. Finally, we show that any HaPPY-Mine equilibrium is also safe against collusion and sybil attacks, and explore how the market value of the currency affects the equilibrium.
Bitcoin vs. Bitcoin Cash: Coexistence or Downfall of Bitcoin Cash?
2017年8月,比特币被拆分为最初的比特币(BTC)和比特币现金(BCH)。从那时起,矿工们就可以在BTC和BCH挖矿之间做出选择,因为他们有兼容的工作量证明算法。因此,他们可以自由选择开采哪种硬币以获得更高的利润,其中盈利能力取决于硬币价格和开采难度。一些矿工只有在挖矿难度发生变化时才能立即将硬币转换为挖矿,因为难度变化比硬币价格更可预测,我们称这种行为为易变挖矿。在本文中,我们通过模拟两个硬币之间的博弈来研究变化无常的采矿的影响。为了做到这一点,我们考虑了善变的矿工和一些派别(例如,BITMAIN for BCH mining),坚持开采一枚硬币来维护该链。在这个模型中,我们证明了变化无常的挖矿会导致一个纳什均衡,在这个均衡中,只有一个坚持挖矿的派别仍然是价值较低的硬币的忠实矿工(例如,BCH),其中忠诚矿工指的是那些即使在硬币挖矿难度增加后仍进行挖矿的人。这种情况会导致严重的集中化,削弱硬币系统的安全性。为了确定竞争硬币系统(例如,BTC vs. BCH)正在走向,我们追溯了BTC和BCH的矿力历史变化。此外,我们分析了最近比特币ABC和SV之间的“哈希战争”,这证实了我们的理论分析。最后,我们注意到,我们的结果可以应用于任何竞争的加密货币系统,其中相同的硬件(例如,ASIC或GPU)可以用于挖矿。因此,我们的研究为竞争性硬币市场带来了新的重要角度:当挖矿硬件在它们之间共享时…