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arXiv 2103.12229cs.GT
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HaPPY-Mine:设计一个挖掘奖励函数

HaPPY-Mine: Designing a Mining Reward Function

Lucianna Kiffer, Rajmohan Rajaraman

摘要:

在加密货币中,区块奖励旨在作为矿工投入资源创建区块的激励机制,并实际上保护系统。现有系统主要与所花费的资源成比例地划分奖励,并且遵循用于总块奖励的两个静态模型之一:(i)每个块的固定奖励(例如,以太坊),或者(ii)区块奖励在每一组区块数量减半的情况下(例如,比特币模型大约每4年减半),但在减半之间保持固定。在最近的工作中,在非对称矿工成本下的静态模型的博弈论分析表明,均衡总是存在的,是唯一的。他们的分析还揭示了不对称成本如何导致区块链挖矿的大规模集中化,这一现象在比特币和以太坊中已经观察到,并在其他研究中得到了强调。在这项工作中,我们引入了一个新的采矿奖励函数家族,HaPPY-Mine(HASH-Pegged Proportional Yield),它将奖励的价值与系统的哈希率挂钩,随着哈希率的增加而减少奖励。HaPPY-Mine按照散列率的比例分配奖励,并继承了广义比例奖励函数的安全属性。我们在异构矿工成本模型下研究了HaPPY-Mine,并证明了均衡总是存在唯一的矿工参与者集合和唯一的总哈希率。值得注意的是,我们证明了在一组指标(包括采矿参与者数量和哈希率分布)下,HaPPY-Mine均衡比静态模型均衡更加分散。最后,我们证明了任何HAPPY-Mine均衡也是安全的,可以抵御共谋和Sybil攻击,并探讨了货币的市场价值如何影响均衡。

英文摘要:

In cryptocurrencies, the block reward is meant to serve as the incentive mechanism for miners to commit resources to create blocks and in effect secure the system. Existing systems primarily divide the reward in proportion to expended resources and follow one of two static models for total block reward: (i) a fixed reward for each block (e.g., Ethereum), or (ii) one where the block reward halves every set number of blocks (e.g., the Bitcoin model of halving roughly every 4 years) but otherwise remains fixed between halvings. In recent work, a game-theoretic analysis of the static model under asymmetric miner costs showed that an equilibrium always exists and is unique. Their analysis also reveals how asymmetric costs can lead to large-scale centralization in blockchain mining, a phenomenon that has been observed in Bitcoin and Ethereum and highlighted by other studies. In this work we introduce a novel family of mining reward functions, HaPPY-Mine (HAsh-Pegged Proportional Yield), which peg the value of the reward to the hashrate of the system, decreasing the reward as the hashrate increases. HaPPY-Mine distributes rewards in proportion to expended hashrate and inherits the safety properties of the generalized proportional reward function. We study HaPPY-Mine under a heterogeneous miner cost model and show that an equilibrium always exists with a unique set of miner participants and a unique total hashrate. Significantly, we prove that a HaPPY-Mine equilibrium is more decentralized than the static model equilibrium under a set of metrics including number of mining participants and hashrate distribution. Finally, we show that any HaPPY-Mine equilibrium is also safe against collusion and sybil attacks, and explore how the market value of the currency affects the equilibrium.

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