去中心化降低了腐败式多数攻击的成本
Decentralization Cheapens Corruptive Majority Attacks
AI总结：
针对区块链腐败式多数攻击成本问题，研究指出Budish的成本界定偏松，提出若多数算力由小矿工控制，攻击成本远低于该界定值，并给出低成本攻击方案及影响讨论。
摘要：
腐败式多数攻击（即算力分布在矿工之间，攻击者试图贿赂多数矿工参与多数攻击的攻击形式）对区块链构成威胁。Budish 将贿赂矿工参与攻击的成本限定为攻击成功导致的矿工预期损失。我们证明这一界定偏松。具体而言，攻击可被设计为：在多数矿工的均衡策略下，单个矿工的参与选择对攻击成功概率仅产生微弱影响。结合攻击成功的大部分成本会被任意单个小矿工外部化这一事实，这意味着如果多数算力由小矿工控制，贿赂矿工参与此类攻击的成本远低于Budish界定值。我们提出了一种低成本腐败式多数攻击方案，并讨论了实际问题与影响。
英文摘要：
Corruptive majority attacks, in which mining power is distributed among miners and an attacker attempts to bribe a majority of miners into participation in a majority attack, pose a threat to blockchains. Budish bounded the cost of bribing miners to participate in an attack by their expected loss as a result of attack success. We show that this bound is loose. In particular, an attack may be structured so that under equilibrium play by most miners, a miner's choice to participate only slightly affects the attack success chance. Combined with the fact that most of the cost of attack success is externalized by any given small miner, this implies that if most mining power is controlled by small miners, bribing miners to participate in such an attack is much cheaper than the Budish bound. We provide a scheme for a cheap corruptive majority attack and discuss practical concerns and consequences.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
