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arXiv 2309.12640cs.GT
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贪婪排序规则下 MEV 让所有人受益

MEV Makes Everyone Happy under Greedy Sequencing Rule

Yuhao Li, Mengqian Zhang, Jichen Li, Elynn Chen, Xi Chen, Xiaotie Deng

AI总结:

本文研究贪婪排序规则下矿工最大化 MEV 的最优策略计算,证明无手续费场景可在多项式时间求解、有固定比例手续费场景为 NP-hard,并发现矿工最优策略同时惠及用户。

摘要:

通过去中心化交易所(DEX)进行交易已成为当今区块链生态系统的关键组成部分,使用户能够高效、自动地交换代币。然而,矿工策略性排序交易的能力导致了剥削性行为(例如抢先交易攻击、三明治攻击),并为自身利益获取大量最大可提取价值(MEV)。为了缓解这种操纵行为,Ferreira 和 Parkes 最近提出了一种贪婪排序规则,使得区块中交易的执行价格围绕起始价格来回波动。利用这种排序规则使矿工无法进行三明治攻击,从而缓解了 MEV 问题。\n然而,没有任何排序规则能够阻止矿工获得无风险利润。本文系统性地研究了在贪婪排序规则下矿工最大化 MEV 的最优策略的计算问题,其中矿工的效用以其代币持有量的总价值来衡量。我们的结果揭示了无交易手续费场景与存在固定比例交易手续费场景之间的二分性:前者可以在多项式时间内求得最优策略,而后者被证明是 NP-hard 的。后者对寻求最优 MEV 的矿工构成了重大挑战。\n基于上述计算结果,我们进一步展示了一个显著现象:矿工的最优 MEV 同样惠及用户。具体而言,在无交易手续费的场景中,当矿工采用我们算法给出的最优策略时,所有用户的交易都将被执行,并且每个用户将获得与其预期相当或更高的利润。这一结果为去中心化交易所中排序规则的研究与设计提供了进一步的支持。

英文摘要:

Trading through decentralized exchanges (DEXs) has become crucial in today's blockchain ecosystem, enabling users to swap tokens efficiently and automatically. However, the capacity of miners to strategically order transactions has led to exploitative practices (e.g., front-running attacks, sandwich attacks) and gain substantial Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) for their own advantage. To mitigate such manipulation, Ferreira and Parkes recently proposed a greedy sequencing rule such that the execution price of transactions in a block moves back and forth around the starting price. Utilizing this sequencing rule makes it impossible for miners to conduct sandwich attacks, consequently mitigating the MEV problem. However, no sequencing rule can prevent miners from obtaining risk-free profits. This paper systemically studies the computation of a miner's optimal strategy for maximizing MEV under the greedy sequencing rule, where the utility of miners is measured by the overall value of their token holdings. Our results unveil a dichotomy between the no trading fee scenario, which can be optimally strategized in polynomial time, and the scenario with a constant fraction of trading fee, where finding the optimal strategy is proven NP-hard. The latter represents a significant challenge for miners seeking optimal MEV. Following the computation results, we further show a remarkable phenomenon: Miner's optimal MEV also benefits users. Precisely, in the scenarios without trading fees, when miners adopt the optimal strategy given by our algorithm, all users' transactions will be executed, and each user will receive equivalent or surpass profits compared to their expectations. This outcome provides further support for the study and design of sequencing rules in decentralized exchanges.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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