多个自私矿工的自私挖掘策略初探
On the Preliminary Investigation of Selfish Mining Strategy with Multiple Selfish Miners
摘要:
Eyal和Sirer的自私采矿策略表明,即使50%的总采矿权由利他主义矿工掌握,比特币系统也不安全。从那时起,研究人员一直在研究如何提高自私挖矿的效率,或者如何防御自私挖矿,通常是在单个自私矿工的情况下。然而,目前还没有研究系统中多个矿工并发使用的自私挖掘策略。这种自私的挖掘策略的有效性及其在这种多个自私矿工设置下所需的挖掘能力仍然是未知的。在本文中,一个初步的调查和我们的研究结果,自私的多矿工使用的挖掘策略。此外,比特币系统的传统模型略有重新设计,以解决其缺点:即单个采矿过程的并发性。虽然在这种情况下自私的挖掘策略的理论分析尚未建立,目前的研究结果的基础上模拟是有前途的,极大的兴趣。特别是,我们的工作表明,自私的挖掘策略所需的功率阈值的下限按比例减少自私的矿工的数量。此外,存在纳什均衡,其中系统中的所有自私矿工都不会改变为诚实的采矿策略,并且同时获得不公平的采矿奖励,因为他们同样拥有足够大的采矿能力。最后,我们的新模型产生的权力阈值安装自私的挖掘策略略大于一个从传统的模型。
英文摘要:
Eyal and Sirer's selfish mining strategy has demonstrated that Bitcoin system is not secure even if 50% of total mining power is held by altruistic miners. Since then, researchers have been investigating either to improve the efficiency of selfish mining, or how to defend against it, typically in a single selfish miner setting. Yet there is no research on a selfish mining strategies concurrently used by multiple miners in the system. The effectiveness of such selfish mining strategies and their required mining power under such multiple selfish miners setting remains unknown. In this paper, a preliminary investigation and our findings of selfish mining strategy used by multiple miners are reported. In addition, the conventional model of Bitcoin system is slightly redesigned to tackle its shortcoming: namely, a concurrency of individual mining processes. Although a theoretical analysis of selfish mining strategy under this setting is yet to be established, the current findings based on simulations is promising and of great interest. In particular, our work shows that a lower bound of power threshold required for selfish mining strategy decreases in proportion to a number of selfish miners. Moreover, there exist Nash equilibria where all selfish miners in the system do not change to an honest mining strategy and simultaneously earn their unfair amount of mining reward given that they equally possess sufficiently large mining power. Lastly, our new model yields a power threshold for mounting selfish mining strategy slightly greater than one from the conventional model.
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