arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv周末暂无论文更新,休息一下吧,周末愉快~~
arXiv 2408.10346cs.GT
收藏

面向部分可转移效用锦标赛的公平且防策略锦标赛规则研究

Toward Fair and Strategyproof Tournament Rules for Tournaments with Partially Transferable Utilities

David Pennock, Ariel Schvartzman, Eric Xue

AI总结:

该研究提出部分可转移效用模型,通过自私参数λ插值效用可转移与不可转移场景,证明λ<1时无公平防操纵锦标赛规则,求解了λ=1且6个智能体以内的对应规则,并分析了相关规则的防策略性权衡与公平性关联。

摘要:

包含$n$个智能体的锦标赛是一个以智能体为顶点的完全有向图,边描述了每对智能体之间进行的$\binom{n}{2}$场比赛的胜负结果。锦标赛的获胜者由锦标赛规则决定,该规则将锦标赛映射为智能体上的概率分布。我们希望这些规则既公平(选出高质量的智能体),又能抵御策略操纵。已有研究表明,在最低限度公平的规则下,当效用不可转移时可以防止两个智能体之间的操纵,但当效用完全可转移时则无法做到。我们提出了一种部分可转移效用模型,该模型通过自私参数$\lambda$在这两种极端情况之间进行插值。我们的模型设定为:一个智能体可能愿意故意输掉比赛,牺牲自己的部分获胜机会,但前提是合谋双方的共同收益大于该智能体个体牺牲的$\lambda$倍。\n我们证明,当$\lambda<1$时,不存在任何公平的锦标赛规则能够防止操纵。我们通过计算求解了$\lambda=1$时最多6个智能体的公平且抗操纵的锦标赛规则。我们推测此类锦标赛规则对所有$n$都存在,并将其作为一个重要的开放问题留待后续研究。我们分析了此前研究的规则在“相对”和“绝对”近似防策略性之间的权衡,并推导得出一个推论:所有这些规则都需要$\lambda\geq\Omega(n$)才能具备抗操纵性。我们还证明,对于更强的公平性概念,不可操纵的锦标赛规则与那些随着智能体数量增加而操纵收益递减的锦标赛规则密切相关。

英文摘要:

A tournament on $n$ agents is a complete oriented graph with the agents as vertices and edges that describe the win-loss outcomes of the $\binom{n}{2}$ matches played between each pair of agents. The winner of a tournament is determined by a tournament rule that maps tournaments to probability distributions over the agents. We want these rules to be fair (choose a high-quality agent) and robust to strategic manipulation. Prior work has shown that under minimally fair rules, manipulations between two agents can be prevented when utility is nontransferable but not when utility is completely transferable. We introduce a partially transferable utility model that interpolates between these two extremes using a selfishness parameter $λ$. Our model is that an agent may be willing to lose on purpose, sacrificing some of her own chance of winning, but only if the colluding pair's joint gain is more than $λ$ times the individual's sacrifice. We show that no fair tournament rule can prevent manipulations when $λ< 1$. We computationally solve for fair and manipulation-resistant tournament rules for $λ= 1$ for up to 6 agents. We conjecture and leave as a major open problem that such a tournament rule exists for all $n$. We analyze the trade-offs between ``relative'' and ``absolute'' approximate strategyproofness for previously studied rules and derive as a corollary that all of these rules require $λ\geq Ω(n)$ to be robust to manipulation. We show that for stronger notions of fairness, non-manipulable tournament rules are closely related to tournament rules that witness decreasing gains from manipulation as the number of agents increases.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑