加法可分Hedonic对策和分数Hedonic对策的策略证明机制
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Fractional Hedonic Games
摘要：
加法可分享乐博弈和分数享乐博弈已经受到了广泛的关注。它们是自私的代理人基于相互偏好的联盟形成游戏。文献中的大多数工作都描述了稳定结果的存在和结构（即，在联盟中的分区），假设偏好是给定的。然而，关于这一假设的讨论很少。事实上，代理人收到不同的效用，如果他们属于不同的分区，因此，这是自然的，他们宣布自己的喜好战略，以最大限度地提高他们的利益。在本文中，我们认为战略的附加可分离的享乐游戏和分数享乐游戏，即，分区方法没有支付，使效用最大化代理没有动机说谎，他们的真实偏好的机制。我们专注于社会福利最大化，并提供了几个下界和上界的strategyproof机制，一般和特定的添加剂功能的性能。在大多数情况下，我们提供紧或渐近紧的结果。我们所有的机制都很简单，可以在多项式时间内计算。此外，所有的下界都是无条件的，也就是说，它们不依赖于任何计算或复杂性假设。
英文摘要：
Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion on this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if they belong to different partitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare their preferences strategically in order to maximize their benefit. In this paper we consider strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games, that is, partitioning methods without payments such that utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about their true preferences. We focus on social welfare maximization and provide several lower and upper bounds on the performance achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for general and specific additive functions. In most of the cases we provide tight or asymptotically tight results. All our mechanisms are simple and can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, all the lower bounds are unconditional, that is, they do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
