无支付或无优先权的更好的防策略机制--一种分析方法
Better Strategyproof Mechanisms without Payments or Prior --- An Analytic Approach
摘要:
我们重新设计的问题strategyproof机制分配可分割的项目之间的两个代理人谁具有线性效用,支付是不允许的,也没有事先的信息代理人的喜好。我们的目标是设计防策略的机制,这是最有效的竞争力(但不是防策略)的机制。对于有两项的情形:(1)给出了一组防策略性的充分条件。(2)我们使用一种分析方法来推导出比所有现有的防策略机制更具竞争力的防策略机制。(3)我们改进了郭和Conitzer的基于线性规划的证明,以显示新的竞争比上界。(4)我们提供了第一个“数学”上限证明。(1)我们在Cole等人提出的部分分配机制的基础上,设计了一个防策略的机制,它是0.67776-竞争的,突破了2/3的障碍。(2)我们提出了一个新的子类的防策略机制称为动态增加价格机制,其中每个代理使用虚拟货币购买的项目,和项目的价格取决于其他代理的偏好。
英文摘要:
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The objective is to design strategyproof mechanisms which are competitive against the most efficient (but not strategyproof) mechanism. For the case with two items: (1) We provide a set of sufficient conditions for strategyproofness. (2) We use an analytic approach to derive strategyproof mechanisms which are more competitive than all prior strategyproof mechanisms. (3) We improve the linear-program-based proof of Guo and Conitzer to show new upper bounds on competitive ratios. (4) We provide the first "mathematical" upper bound proof. For the cases with any number of items: (1) We build on the Partial Allocation mechanisms introduced by Cole et al. to design a strategyproof mechanism which is 0.67776-competitive, breaking the 2/3 barrier. (2) We propose a new subclass of strategyproof mechanisms called Dynamical-Increasing-Price mechanisms, where each agent purchases the items using virtual money, and the prices of the items depend on other agents' preferences.
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