购买共享资源的单调偏好聚合机制
Monotonic Preference Aggregation Mechanisms for Purchasing a Shareable Resource
摘要:
在市场上,一群代理人走到一起,共同购买他们个人买不起的资源的情况是常见的。例如,在美国的无线电频谱市场,最近的一项提议邀请那些将从获得更多频谱使用权中受益的小公司联合提交频谱块的投标,其想法是可以共享频谱的使用。在这种情况下,问题是设计一种机制,真实地提取和汇总这些代理人的私人偏好,并使他们能够作为一个单一的决策机构参与市场。在本文中,我们设计了一类称为单调聚合机制的机制,可以在特定设置下实现这一目标。我们假设资源在密封投标第二价格拍卖中出售,该拍卖对整个资源进行招标。我们的机制真实地从买家那里提取效用函数,规定了联合出价,并规定了在拍卖中赢得资源的情况下支付和资源的分配。这一机制进一步满足了一个流行的抗共谋概念,即联盟防策略性。我们给出了两个明确的例子,这种通用类的情况下,买方的效用函数是非递减和凹的。
英文摘要:
Situations where a group of agents come together to jointly buy a resource that they individually cannot afford to buy are commonly observed in markets. For example in the US market for radio spectrum, a recent proposal invited small firms who would benefit from gaining additional access to spectrum to jointly submit bids for blocks of spectrum with the idea that its utilization could be shared. In such a scenario, the problem is to design a mechanism that truthfully elicits and aggregates the privately held preferences of these agents, and enables them to act as a single decision-making body in order to participate in the market. In this paper, we design a class of mechanisms called monotonic aggregation mechanisms that achieves this under a specific setting. We assume that the resource is being sold in a sealed-bid second-price auction that solicits bids for the entire resource. Our mechanism truthfully elicits utility functions from the buyers, prescribes a joint bid, and prescribes a division of the payment and the resource in the event that they win the resource in the auction. This mechanism further satisfies a popular notion of collusion-resistance known as coalition-strategyproofness. We give two explicit examples of this generic class for the case where the utility functions of the buyers are non-decreasing and concave.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。