成本分担的群体防策略机制的完整特征
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
摘要：
我们研究的问题，设计集团战略防护成本分担机制。玩家报告他们获得服务的出价，该机制决定哪些玩家将获得服务以及他们每个人将支付多少。我们确定三个条件：分配的\emph{Fence Monotonicity}、\emph{Stability}和平局打破规则的\emph{Validity}对于组策略防护是必要和充分的，而与成本函数无关。栅栏单调性仅对机制的支付进行限制，而稳定性仅对分配进行限制。因此，栅栏单调性特征组策略的防成本分担计划。最后，我们利用我们的结果证明了存在一族的成本函数，其中任何组策略防护机制具有无界的逼近比。
英文摘要：
We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides which players are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to pay. We determine three conditions: \emph{Fence Monotonicity}, \emph{Stability} of the allocation and \emph{Validity} of the tie-breaking rule that are necessary and sufficient for group-strategyproofness, regardless of the cost function. Fence Monotonicity puts restrictions only on the payments of the mechanism and stability only on the allocation. Consequently Fence Monotonicity characterizes group-strategyproof cost-sharing schemes. Finally, we use our results to prove that there exist families of cost functions, where any group-strategyproof mechanism has unbounded approximation ratio.
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