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arXiv 2107.11977cs.GT
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扰动稳定实例中的防策略设施选址

Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances

Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos

AI总结:

本文研究扰动稳定的 $k$-设施选址博弈,证明稳定实例下确定性与随机化防策略机制的近似保证,并给出低稳定性下的不可能性结果。

摘要:

我们考虑 $k$-设施选址博弈,其中 $n$ 个策略性智能体报告其在实线上的位置,机制将这些位置映射到 $k\ge 2$ 个设施。每个智能体都力求最小化其到最近设施的距离。我们关注无需支付、且相对于智能体最优社会成本能达到合理近似比的(确定性或随机化)防策略机制。为规避确定性防策略机制对 $k$-设施选址的不可近似性,我们将注意力限制在扰动稳定实例上。实线上的一个 $k$-设施选址实例被称为 $\gamma$-扰动稳定(或简称 $\gamma$-稳定)实例(其中 $\gamma\ge 1$),条件是:将任意连续智能体位置子集彼此靠近至多 $\gamma$ 倍,不会影响最优智能体聚类。我们证明,在最优解不包含任何单点簇的 $(2+\sqrt{3})$-稳定实例中,最优解具有防策略性;同时,对于 $5$-稳定实例(即使其最优解包含单点簇),将设施分配给每个最优簇中最右侧智能体旁边的智能体(对于单点簇则分配给唯一智能体)是防策略的,并且达到 $(n-2)/2$ 近似。在负面结果方面,我们证明,对于任意 $k\ge 3$ 和任意 $\delta>0$,在 $(\sqrt{2}-\delta)$-稳定实例中,不存在能达到有界近似比且具有防策略性的确定性匿名机制。我们还证明,在 $5$-稳定实例中,将设施随机分配给每个最优簇中的一个智能体是防策略的,并达到 $2$ 近似。据我们所知,这是首次针对一大类自然的 $k$-设施选址实例,证明存在具有有界(相应地,常数)近似比的确定性(相应地,随机化)防策略机制。

英文摘要:

We consider $k$-Facility Location games, where $n$ strategic agents report their locations on the real line, and a mechanism maps them to $k\ge 2$ facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize her distance to the nearest facility. We are interested in (deterministic or randomized) strategyproof mechanisms without payments that achieve a reasonable approximation ratio to the optimal social cost of the agents. To circumvent the inapproximability of $k$-Facility Location by deterministic strategyproof mechanisms, we restrict our attention to perturbation stable instances. An instance of $k$-Facility Location on the line is $γ$-perturbation stable (or simply, $γ$-stable), for some $γ\ge 1$, if the optimal agent clustering is not affected by moving any subset of consecutive agent locations closer to each other by a factor at most $γ$. We show that the optimal solution is strategyproof in $(2+\sqrt{3})$-stable instances whose optimal solution does not include any singleton clusters, and that allocating the facility to the agent next to the rightmost one in each optimal cluster (or to the unique agent, for singleton clusters) is strategyproof and $(n-2)/2$-approximate for $5$-stable instances (even if their optimal solution includes singleton clusters). On the negative side, we show that for any $k\ge 3$ and any $δ> 0$, there is no deterministic anonymous mechanism that achieves a bounded approximation ratio and is strategyproof in $(\sqrt{2}-δ)$-stable instances. We also prove that allocating the facility to a random agent of each optimal cluster is strategyproof and $2$-approximate in $5$-stable instances. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the existence of deterministic (resp. randomized) strategyproof mechanisms with a bounded (resp. constant) approximation ratio is shown for a large and natural class of $k$-Facility Location instances.

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