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arXiv 2107.05175cs.GT
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群体公平设施选址问题的防策略机制

Strategyproof Mechanisms For Group-Fair Facility Location Problems

Houyu Zhou, Minming Li, Hau Chan

AI总结:

针对实线上多群体设施选址,论文研究防策略且群体公平的机制,分析不同成本目标的近似比与下界,并提出满足IIF的紧近似机制。

摘要:

我们研究设施选址问题,其中智能体位于一条实线上,并根据种族或年龄等标准划分为不同群体。我们的目标是设计机制来确定设施位置,以在真实获取智能体位置的同时,公平地近似最小化各智能体群体到设施的成本。我们首先探索该问题中多种具有充分动机的群体公平成本目标,并证明许多自然目标具有无界的近似比。随后,我们考虑最小化最大群体总成本和最小化平均群体成本这两个目标。对于这些目标,我们证明现有的经典机制(例如中位数机制)以及新的基于群体的机制能够提供有界近似比,其中基于群体的机制可以实现更优的比率。我们还给出了这两个目标的下界。为衡量群体之间以及每个群体内部的公平性,我们研究了群体间与群体内公平性(IIF)这一新概念。我们考虑两个IIF目标,并给出具有紧近似比的机制。

英文摘要:

We study the facility location problems where agents are located on a real line and divided into groups based on criteria such as ethnicity or age. Our aim is to design mechanisms to locate a facility to approximately minimize the costs of groups of agents to the facility fairly while eliciting the agents' locations truthfully. We first explore various well-motivated group fairness cost objectives for the problems and show that many natural objectives have an unbounded approximation ratio. We then consider minimizing the maximum total group cost and minimizing the average group cost objectives. For these objectives, we show that existing classical mechanisms (e.g., median) and new group-based mechanisms provide bounded approximation ratios, where the group-based mechanisms can achieve better ratios. We also provide lower bounds for both objectives. To measure fairness between groups and within each group, we study a new notion of intergroup and intragroup fairness (IIF) . We consider two IIF objectives and provide mechanisms with tight approximation ratios.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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