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arXiv 2205.14798cs.GTcs.AIcs.MAecon.TH
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Random Rank:唯一的防策略和比例公平的随机设施选址机制

Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism

UNSW Sydney(悉尼新南威尔士大学)

Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam, Mashbat Suzuki, Toby Walsh

摘要:

比例是一个有吸引力的公平概念,已被应用于一系列问题,包括设施选址问题,社会选择中的经典问题。在我们的工作中,我们提出了一个称为强比例的概念,它确保了当有两组代理在不同的位置,两组产生相同的总成本。我们表明,虽然强比例性是一个动机良好的基本公理,没有确定性的防策略机制满足的属性。然后,我们确定了一个随机机制,称为随机排名(它统一选择一个数字$k$之间的$1$到$n$和定位设施在$k$的第一个最高的代理位置),满足强比例的期望。我们的主要定理将随机秩描述为在所有随机机制中实现普遍真实性、普遍匿名性和期望中的强比例性的唯一机制。最后,我们通过AverageOrRandomRank机制表明,通过将普遍真实性弱化为预期中的防策略性,可以实现更强的事后公平性保证。

英文摘要:

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number $k$ between $1$ to $n$ and locates the facility at the $k$'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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