明显的防策略性需要监控以获得良好的近似
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations
摘要：
明显的防策略性（OSP）是一个有吸引力的概念，因为它允许即使在代理人不完全理性的情况下也能保持激励相容性，例如，那些与偶然推理作斗争的人[李，2015]。然而，已经表明它施加了一些限制，例如，没有OSP机制可以返回稳定的匹配[Ashlagi和Gonczarowski，2015]。在这里，我们深入研究OSP机制的局限性，通过查看它们对该领域基本优化问题的近似保证，即，机器调度和设施定位。我们证明了一些界限上的近似保证OSP机制，这表明OSP可以在一个显着的成本。然而，令人惊讶的是，我们证明了OSP机制在使用监控时可以返回最优解--一种新的机制设计范例，它对代理的声明引入了温和的审查水平[Kovacs等人，2015年]。
英文摘要：
Obvious strategyproofness (OSP) is an appealing concept as it allows to maintain incentive compatibility even in the presence of agents that are not fully rational, e.g., those who struggle with contingent reasoning [Li, 2015]. However, it has been shown to impose some limitations, e.g., no OSP mechanism can return a stable matching [Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2015]. We here deepen the study of the limitations of OSP mechanisms by looking at their approximation guarantees for basic optimization problems paradigmatic of the area, i.e., machine scheduling and facility location. We prove a number of bounds on the approximation guarantee of OSP mechanisms, which show that OSP can come at a significant cost. However, rather surprisingly, we prove that OSP mechanisms can return optimal solutions when they use monitoring -- a novel mechanism design paradigm that introduces a mild level of scrutiny on agents' declarations [Kovacs et al., 2015].
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
