Gibbard-Satterthwaite成功案例和明显的战略防御性
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness
摘要：
Gibbard-Satterthwaite不可能性定理认为，独裁是唯一的帕累托最优和战略防护的社会选择功能的全部域的偏好。机制设计中的许多工作都是为了绕过这个不可能定理。三个伟大的成功故事脱颖而出。在单峰值偏好、房屋匹配和准线性偏好领域，存在有吸引力的帕累托最优和防策略的社会选择函数。我们调查这些成功案例是否对加强战略防御性到明显的战略防御性（OSP）具有鲁棒性，最近由Li（2015）提出。对于单峰的偏好，我们的特点是类的OSP可实现的和一致的社会选择功能的独裁者与极端主义的保障机制（原来也是帕累托最优），独裁者可以选择的结果，但其他代理人可能会阻止独裁者选择一个结果，这是太极端。因此，中位数投票是不能在OSS中实现的。事实上，只有在OSP中可实现的分位数规则选择最小或最大理想点。对于房子匹配，我们的特点是类的OSP实现和帕累托最优匹配规则的顺序易货与潜伏者-一个显着的概括超过专横的双极系列独裁规则的变体。虽然Li（2015）表明，当只出售一件商品时，第二价格拍卖是可实现的，但我们表明，这个积极的结果并不适用于多件商品的情况。即使当所有代理人对商品的偏好是准线性和可加性的，没有福利最大化的拍卖，失败者不支付任何是OSP-implementable当一个以上的好被出售。我们的分析利用了一个渐进的启示原则，一个模拟的（直接）启示原则的OSP机制，我们提出并证明。
英文摘要：
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much of the work in mechanism design aims at getting around this impossibility theorem. Three grand success stories stand out. On the domains of single peaked preferences, of house matching, and of quasilinear preferences, there are appealing Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice functions. We investigate whether these success stories are robust to strengthening strategyproofness to obvious strategyproofness (OSP), recently introduced by Li (2015). For single peaked preferences, we characterize the class of OSP-implementable and unanimous social choice functions as dictatorships with safeguards against extremism - mechanisms (which turn out to also be Pareto optimal) in which the dictator can choose the outcome, but other agents may prevent the dictator from choosing an outcome that is too extreme. Median voting is consequently not OSP-implementable. Indeed, the only OSP-implementable quantile rules choose either the minimal or the maximal ideal point. For house matching, we characterize the class of OSP-implementable and Pareto optimal matching rules as sequential barter with lurkers - a significant generalization over bossy variants of bipolar serially dictatorial rules. While Li (2015) shows that second-price auctions are OSP-implementable when only one good is sold, we show that this positive result does not extend to the case of multiple goods. Even when all agents' preferences over goods are quasilinear and additive, no welfare-maximizing auction where losers pay nothing is OSP-implementable when more than one good is sold. Our analysis makes use of a gradual revelation principle, an analog of the (direct) revelation principle for OSP mechanisms that we present and prove.
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