关于最优销售两种均匀分布商品的注记
A Note on Selling Optimally Two Uniformly Distributed Goods
摘要:
我们对巴甫洛夫[2011]关于销售两种具有一致i.i.d.的商品的收入最大化机制的结果提供了一个新的、更简化和直接的证明。在间隔$[c,c+1]$上的估价,提供给添加剂购买者。这是通过明确定义最佳的双重解决方案,以一个宽松的版本的问题,其中凸性要求投标人的效用已经下降。它们的最优性直接来自于它们的结构,通过使用精确互补。对于$c=0$和$c\geq 0.092$,结果表明,相应的最优原始解是一个可行的销售机制,因此初始松弛没有损失,收入最大化随之而来。然而,对于$0<c<0.092$,情况并非如此,这是第一个明确的例子,其中放松凸性可证明不是免费的,即使在两项定期i.i.d.中。设置.
英文摘要:
We provide a new, much simplified and straightforward proof to a result of Pavlov [2011] regarding the revenue maximizing mechanism for selling two goods with uniformly i.i.d. valuations over intervals $[c,c+1]$, to an additive buyer. This is done by explicitly defining optimal dual solutions to a relaxed version of the problem, where the convexity requirement for the bidder's utility has been dropped. Their optimality comes directly from their structure, through the use of exact complementarity. For $c=0$ and $c\geq 0.092$ it turns out that the corresponding optimal primal solution is a feasible selling mechanism, thus the initial relaxation comes without a loss, and revenue maximality follows. However, for $0<c<0.092$ that's not the case, providing the first clear example where relaxing convexity provably does not come for free, even in a two-item regularly i.i.d. setting.
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