出售两件相同的物品
Selling Two Identical Objects
摘要:
众所周知,最佳(即,收入最大化)的销售机制可能涉及随机化。我们得到的条件下,确定性机制是最佳的销售两个相同的,不可分割的对象给一个单一的买家。我们分析了两种设置:(i)递减边际值(DMV)和(ii)递增边际值(IMV)。因此,买方对这两个单位的价值不是独立的。我们证明了在一个众所周知的分布条件下(由于McAfee和McMillan(1988)),(a)在DMV模型中确定性地出售第一个单位是最优的,(b)在IMV模型中捆绑(这是一种确定性机制)是最优的。在一个更强的分布充分条件下,DMV模型中的确定性机制是最优的。我们的研究结果适用于异构对象时,有一个指定的序列中,这两个对象必须出售。
英文摘要:
It is well-known that optimal (i.e., revenue-maximizing) selling mechanisms in multidimensional type spaces may involve randomization. We obtain conditions under which deterministic mechanisms are optimal for selling two identical, indivisible objects to a single buyer. We analyze two settings: (i) decreasing marginal values (DMV) and (ii) increasing marginal values (IMV). Thus, the values of the buyer for the two units are not independent. We show that under a well-known condition on distributions~(due to McAfee and McMillan (1988)), (a) it is optimal to sell the first unit deterministically in the DMV model and (b) it is optimal to bundle (which is a deterministic mechanism) in the IMV model. Under a stronger sufficient condition on distributions, a deterministic mechanism is optimal in the DMV model. Our results apply to heterogeneous objects when there is a specified sequence in which the two objects must be sold.
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