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arXiv 2502.10086econ.TH
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通过自动化机制设计向单需求买家出售多个物品

Selling Multiple Items to a Unit-Demand Buyer via Automated Mechanism Design

Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo(东京大学经济学部);Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo(东京大学经济学研究科);Department of Economics, Yale University(耶鲁大学经济学系)

Kento Hashimoto, Keita Kuwahara, Reo Nonaka

AI总结:

本文通过自动化机制设计方法,证明了在特定价值分布下,统一定价策略在出售多个物品时最优,并发现新的关于均匀定价最优性的结果。

摘要:

寻找最优(收益最大化)机制以出售多个物品一直是突出且 notoriously 难以解决的开放性问题。现有研究主要集中在推导针对特定问题类别的分析结果(例如,Giannakopoulos, 2015; Yang, 2025)。本文探讨了自动化机制设计(AMD)普遍适用方法的可能性。我们首先使用 Dütting 等人(2023)开发的深度学习算法来数值求解小规模问题,然后通过猜测进行推广,最后通过对偶性严格验证。通过关注可以消费一个物品的单个买家,我们的方法带来了两个关键贡献:建立了一种更简单的验证广泛问题最优性的方法,并发现了关于均匀定价最优性的全新结果。首先,我们证明当价值分布属于包含均匀分布为特殊情况的类别时,对每个物品定价相同(或等价于出售所有物品的组合包)在任何数量的物品情况下都是最优的。不同物品允许有不同的分布。其次,对于每个物品数量,我们建立了必须满足的条件 $c $ 以使均匀定价在价值分布在区间 $[c, c+1]$ 上均匀时最优。后者模型不满足之前已知的关于组合包最优性的充分条件(Haghpanah & Hartline, 2021)。我们的结果与已知的 $n $ 个物品(对于任何 $n$)的结果相反,即 Giannakopoulos(2015)和 Daskalakis 等人(2017)考虑的是具有加性偏好的单个买家,其中物品的价值被严格限制为 i.i.d. 根据均匀或指数分布。

英文摘要:

Finding the optimal (revenue-maximizing) mechanism to sell multiple items has been a prominent and notoriously difficult open problem. Existing work has mainly focused on deriving analytical results tailored to a particular class of problems (for example, Giannakopoulos, 2015; Yang, 2025). The present paper explores the possibility of a generally applicable methodology of the Automated Mechanism Design (AMD). We first employ the deep learning algorithm developed by Dütting et al. (2023) to numerically solve small-sized problems, and the results are then generalized by educated guesswork and finally rigorously verified through duality. By focusing on a single buyer who can consume one item, our approach leads to two key contributions: establishing a much simpler way to verify the optimality of a wide range of problems and discovering a completely new result about the optimality of uniform pricing. First, we show that selling each item at an identical price (or equivalently, selling the grand bundle of all items) is optimal for any number of items when the value distributions belong to a class that includes the uniform distribution as a special case. Different items are allowed to have different distributions. Second, for each number of items, we established necessary and sufficient conditions that $c$ must satisfy for uniform pricing to be optimal when the value distribution is uniform over an interval $[c, c+1]$. This latter model does not satisfy the previously known sufficient conditions for the optimality of grand bundling (Haghpanah & Hartline, 2021). Our results are in contrast to the only known results for $n$ items (for any $n$), Giannakopoulos (2015) and Daskalakis et al. (2017), which consider a single buyer with additive preferences, where the values of items are narrowly restricted to i.i.d. according to a uniform or exponential distribution.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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