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arXiv 1809.06770econ.TH
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销售信息

Selling Information

Weijie Zhong

摘要:

我考虑的是信息商品的垄断定价。购买者为信息付费的意愿来自于对决策行为的未知收益的推断。垄断的卖方和买方都观察到一个关于收益的私人信号。卖方的信号是二进制的,她可以承诺向买方出售她的信号的任何统计实验。假设买方的决策问题涉及丰富的行动,我的特点是利润最大化的菜单。它包含一系列实验,每个实验包含不同数量的信息。同时发现了购买者私人信息和信息提供之间的互补性:当购买者的私人信息越多,最优菜单包含的信息实验就越多。

英文摘要:

I consider the monopolistic pricing of informational good. A buyer's willingness to pay for information is from inferring the unknown payoffs of actions in decision making. A monopolistic seller and the buyer each observes a private signal about the payoffs. The seller's signal is binary and she can commit to sell any statistical experiment of her signal to the buyer. Assuming that buyer's decision problem involves rich actions, I characterize the profit maximizing menu. It contains a continuum of experiments, each containing different amount of information. I also find a complementarity between buyer's private information and information provision: when buyer's private signal is more informative, the optimal menu contains more informative experiments.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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