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arXiv 1708.08907cs.GT
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利用最优运输对偶确定近似最优拍卖的菜单大小

Bounding the Menu-Size of Approximately Optimal Auctions via Optimal-Transport Duality

Yannai A. Gonczarowski

摘要:

近似的最小菜单大小的问题(即,Hart和Nisan(2013)引入了向可加性风险中性准线性买家出售两种商品时的贝叶斯收入最大化,他们给出了该问题的上界$\varepsilon$。使用Daskalakis等人的最优运输对偶框架。(2013,2015),我们推导出这个问题的第一个下界-$Ω(\frac{1}{\sqrt[4]{\varepsilon}})$,即使两种商品的价值是独立同分布的。从“好”的分布,建立如何通过这个对偶框架的原因近似最优机制。这个界限意味着,对于任何固定数量的货物,一个严格的界限上的最小确定性通信复杂性的$Θ(\log\frac{1}{\varepsilon})$保证足以运行一些近似的收入最大化的机制,从而完全解决这个问题。作为第二个结果,我们表明,在标准的经济假设分布,上述上限的哈特和Nisan(2013)可以加强到$O(\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2})$。

英文摘要:

The question of the minimum menu-size for approximate (i.e., up-to-$\varepsilon$) Bayesian revenue maximization when selling two goods to an additive risk-neutral quasilinear buyer was introduced by Hart and Nisan (2013), who give an upper bound of $O(\frac{1}{\varepsilon^4})$ for this problem. Using the optimal-transport duality framework of Daskalakis et al. (2013, 2015), we derive the first lower bound for this problem - of $Ω(\frac{1}{\sqrt[4]{\varepsilon}})$, even when the values for the two goods are drawn i.i.d. from "nice" distributions, establishing how to reason about approximately optimal mechanisms via this duality framework. This bound implies, for any fixed number of goods, a tight bound of $Θ(\log\frac{1}{\varepsilon})$ on the minimum deterministic communication complexity guaranteed to suffice for running some approximately revenue-maximizing mechanism, thereby completely resolving this problem. As a secondary result, we show that under standard economic assumptions on distributions, the above upper bound of Hart and Nisan (2013) can be strengthened to $O(\frac{1}{\varepsilon^2})$.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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