arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1805.03382cs.AIcs.GT
收藏

基于神经网络的机制设计自动化

Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networks

IIIS, Tsinghua University(清华大学交叉信息研究院)

Weiran Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Song Zuo

摘要:

使用人工智能方法来自动设计机制一直是人工智能和经济学接口的中心研究任务[Conitzer和Sandholm,2002]。以前的方法,试图设计收入最佳拍卖的多维设置在三个方面的至少一个不足:1)表示-搜索的空间,可能甚至不包含最佳的机制; 2)准确性-找到一个机制,要么是不真实的或远离最佳的; 3)域依赖性-需要不同的设计不同的环境设置。为了解决这三个难题,本文提出了一个统一的基于神经网络的框架-- MenuNet,它可以自动学习设计收益优化机制。我们的框架由一个机制网络和一个买方网络组成,前者接受一个输入分布进行训练,并输出一个机制,后者接受一个机制作为输入,并输出一个动作。这种设计上的分离通过使买方的理性选择减轻了对机制施加激励相容性约束的困难。因此,我们的框架很容易克服前面提到的困难,将IC约束,并始终返回完全激励兼容的机制。然后,我们将我们的框架应用到一些多项收入最优设计设置,其中一些理论上的最优机制是未知的。然后,我们继续从理论上证明,我们的框架发现的机制确实是最优的。据我们所知,我们是第一个应用神经网络发现最佳的拍卖机制与可证明的最优性。

英文摘要:

Using AI approaches to automatically design mechanisms has been a central research mission at the interface of AI and economics [Conitzer and Sandholm, 2002]. Previous approaches that attempt to design revenue optimal auctions for the multi-dimensional settings fall short in at least one of the three aspects: 1) representation -- search in a space that probably does not even contain the optimal mechanism; 2) exactness -- finding a mechanism that is either not truthful or far from optimal; 3) domain dependence -- need a different design for different environment settings. To resolve the three difficulties, in this paper, we put forward -- MenuNet -- a unified neural network based framework that automatically learns to design revenue optimal mechanisms. Our framework consists of a mechanism network that takes an input distribution for training and outputs a mechanism, as well as a buyer network that takes a mechanism as input and output an action. Such a separation in design mitigates the difficulty to impose incentive compatibility constraints on the mechanism, by making it a rational choice of the buyer. As a result, our framework easily overcomes the previously mentioned difficulty in incorporating IC constraints and always returns exactly incentive compatible mechanisms. We then apply our framework to a number of multi-item revenue optimal design settings, for a few of which the theoretically optimal mechanisms are unknown. We then go on to theoretically prove that the mechanisms found by our framework are indeed optimal. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply neural networks to discover optimal auction mechanisms with provable optimality.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑