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arXiv 1506.00682cs.GT
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具有捆绑折扣的团购:计算高效、稳定和公平的解决方案

Group buying with bundle discounts: computing efficient, stable and fair solutions

Lorenzo Coviello, Yiling Chen, Massimo Franceschetti

摘要:

我们建立了一个市场模型,在这个市场中,非战略供应商销售不同类型的商品,并根据需求量以折扣价格提供捆绑销售。每个购买者都有策略地采取行动,以最大限度地提高其效用,这是由产品估值和支付价格之间的差异决定的。买方以成套物品的保留价报告其估价,并可能愿意支付不同于市场价格的价格,以补贴其他买方并引发折扣。由此产生的价格歧视可以解释为总折扣的再分配。我们考虑一个稳定的概念,着眼于单方面的偏差,并表明,有效的分配-最大化的社会福利-可以稳定的价格,享有理想的属性的合理性和公平性。这就要求购买者支付更高的价格,只是为了补贴那些为激活所需折扣做出贡献的人,而且他们支付的溢价与他们的盈余成比例,即他们的当前效用与他们的最佳替代品的效用之间的差额。因此,由此产生的价格歧视似乎是买方所希望的。在这个存在性结果的基础上,让N,M和c是买家,供应商和产品类型的数量,我们提出了一个O(N^2+NM^c)算法,该算法在给定有效分配的情况下,计算出合理和公平的价格,并稳定市场。该算法首先确定具有相同产品选择的购买者组之间的折扣的再分配,然后计算单个购买者的价格。我们的研究结果表明,如果一个理想的形式的价格歧视的实施,那么社会效率和稳定性可以共存于一个市场呈现微妙的外部性,并计算个人的价格从市场价格是易于处理的。

英文摘要:

We model a market in which nonstrategic vendors sell items of different types and offer bundles at discounted prices triggered by demand volumes. Each buyer acts strategically in order to maximize her utility, given by the difference between product valuation and price paid. Buyers report their valuations in terms of reserve prices on sets of items, and might be willing to pay prices different than the market price in order to subsidize other buyers and to trigger discounts. The resulting price discrimination can be interpreted as a redistribution of the total discount. We consider a notion of stability that looks at unilateral deviations, and show that efficient allocations - the ones maximizing the social welfare - can be stabilized by prices that enjoy desirable properties of rationality and fairness. These dictate that buyers pay higher prices only to subsidize others who contribute to the activation of the desired discounts, and that they pay premiums over the discounted price proportionally to their surplus - the difference between their current utility and the utility of their best alternative. Therefore, the resulting price discrimination appears to be desirable to buyers. Building on this existence result, and letting N, M and c be the numbers of buyers, vendors and product types, we propose a O(N^2+NM^c) algorithm that, given an efficient allocation, computes prices that are rational and fair and that stabilize the market. The algorithm first determines the redistribution of the discount between groups of buyers with an equal product choice, and then computes single buyers' prices. Our results show that if a desirable form of price discrimination is implemented then social efficiency and stability can coexists in a market presenting subtle externalities, and computing individual prices from market prices is tractable.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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