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arXiv 1402.4194cs.GTcs.DS
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论信号的硬度

On the Hardness of Signaling

Shaddin Dughmi

摘要:

最近,人们对信息在战略互动中的作用产生了浓厚的兴趣。大部分的工作都是为了了解如何实现均衡的游戏是由环境中的不确定性和信息提供给玩家在游戏中的影响。隐藏在这些文献之下的是一个基本的,但在很大程度上未被探索的算法问题:一个了解额外信息并具备特定目标的“做市商”应该如何告知游戏中的玩家?这是机制设计问题的信息类比,将博弈的信息结构视为待设计的数学对象,而不是外生变量。我们启动了一个复杂性理论的检查一般贝叶斯游戏,任务通常被称为信号的最佳信息结构的设计。我们专注于信号问题的最简单的实例之一:贝叶斯零和博弈,以及一个必须选择一个信息结构最大化其中一个玩家的均衡收益的主体。在这种情况下,我们表明,最佳信号是计算上难以处理的,在某些情况下,很难近似,假设它是很难恢复种植集团从Erdos-Renyi随机图。尽管这些博弈中的均衡可以在多项式时间内计算,但这表明最优信号的难度与均衡计算的难度是不同的。必要的信息结构的非局部性质,途中我们的结果证明了“放大引理”的种植集团问题,这可能是独立的利益。

英文摘要:

There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information available to players in the game. Lurking beneath this literature is a fundamental, yet largely unexplored, algorithmic question: how should a "market maker" who is privy to additional information, and equipped with a specified objective, inform the players in the game? This is an informational analogue of the mechanism design question, and views the information structure of a game as a mathematical object to be designed, rather than an exogenous variable. We initiate a complexity-theoretic examination of the design of optimal information structures in general Bayesian games, a task often referred to as signaling. We focus on one of the simplest instantiations of the signaling question: Bayesian zero-sum games, and a principal who must choose an information structure maximizing the equilibrium payoff of one of the players. In this setting, we show that optimal signaling is computationally intractable, and in some cases hard to approximate, assuming that it is hard to recover a planted clique from an Erdos-Renyi random graph. This is despite the fact that equilibria in these games are computable in polynomial time, and therefore suggests that the hardness of optimal signaling is a distinct phenomenon from the hardness of equilibrium computation. Necessitated by the non-local nature of information structures, en-route to our results we prove an "amplification lemma" for the planted clique problem which may be of independent interest.

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