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arXiv 1409.1487cs.GT
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感知游戏和隐私

Perception Games and Privacy

Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky

摘要:

参与者(个人、公司、国家等)有隐私问题,可能会影响他们在战略环境中的行动选择。我们使用一种信号博弈的变体来模拟这种效应,并研究其与池化行为、信息误报和效率低下的关系。我们讨论了这些问题,并表明,共同的直觉可能会导致不准确的结论隐私问题的影响。

英文摘要:

Players (people, firms, states, etc.) have privacy concerns that may affect their choice of actions in strategic settings. We use a variant of signaling games to model this effect and study its relation to pooling behavior, misrepresentation of information, and inefficiency. We discuss these issues and show that common intuitions may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the implications of privacy concerns.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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