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arXiv 1601.00167cs.GT
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激励隐私感知用户同意位置跟踪的博弈模型

Game-Theoretic Model of Incentivizing Privacy-Aware Users to Consent to Location Tracking

Emmanouil Panaousis, Aron Laszka, Johannes Pohl, Andreas Noack, Tansu Alpcan

摘要:

如今,移动用户拥有大量的应用程序和服务。这些都可能对用户的“个人身份信息”(PII)造成一些隐私威胁。位置隐私是PII的重要组成部分,因此,隐私意识强的用户希望最大限度地提高位置隐私。例如,这种隐私可能会受到公司的威胁,该公司收集用户的跟踪并与第三方共享。为了最大限度地保护他们的位置隐私,用户可以决定离线,以便公司无法定位他们的设备。用户与网络保持连接的时间越长,他可能获得的服务就越多,但他的位置隐私就会减少。在本文中,我们分析了位置隐私,服务水平,用户体验,和公司的利润之间的权衡。为此,我们制定了用户(追随者)和公司(领导者)之间的Stackelberg贝叶斯博弈。我们提出了表征博弈均衡的理论结果。据我们所知,我们的工作是第一个对服务提供商的经济合理决策进行建模的工作(即,本公司)与希望保护其位置隐私的用户的理性决策相结合。为了评估我们的方法的性能,我们使用了来自测试平台的真实数据,我们还表明,该公司的博弈论策略优于非战略方法。最后,我们考虑了不同的用户隐私类型,并确定了激励用户尽可能长时间保持连接的服务级别。

英文摘要:

Nowadays, mobile users have a vast number of applications and services at their disposal. Each of these might impose some privacy threats on users' "Personally Identifiable Information" (PII). Location privacy is a crucial part of PII, and as such, privacy-aware users wish to maximize it. This privacy can be, for instance, threatened by a company, which collects users' traces and shares them with third parties. To maximize their location privacy, users can decide to get offline so that the company cannot localize their devices. The longer a user stays connected to a network, the more services he might receive, but his location privacy decreases. In this paper, we analyze the trade-off between location privacy, the level of services that a user experiences, and the profit of the company. To this end, we formulate a Stackelberg Bayesian game between the User (follower) and the Company (leader). We present theoretical results characterizing the equilibria of the game. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to model the economically rational decision-making of the service provider (i.e., the Company) in conjunction with the rational decision-making of users who wish to protect their location privacy. To evaluate the performance of our approach, we have used real-data from a testbed, and we have also shown that the game-theoretic strategy of the Company outperforms non-strategic methods. Finally, we have considered different User privacy types, and have determined the service level that incentivizes the User to stay connected as long as possible.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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