在 General Lotto 博弈中策略性地揭示能力
Strategically revealing capabilities in General Lotto games
AI总结：
本文在 General Lotto 博弈的非对称信息环境中，推导了信号发送者通过带噪信号揭示资源预算的子博弈完美均衡，并给出了能改善其表现的最优信号策略的充分必要条件。
摘要：
向对手揭示自身的竞争能力是否能带来战略收益？本文在 General Lotto 博弈（一类双人竞争性资源分配模型）的背景下探讨此问题。我们考虑一种非对称信息环境，其中对手对另一玩家的资源预算存在不确定性，并对其价值持有先验信念。我们假设另一玩家（称为信号发送者）能够向对手发送关于其预算的带噪信号。对手在更新信念后，必须决定投资将在 General Lotto 博弈中用于对抗信号发送者资源预算的昂贵资源。我们推导了该扩展式博弈的子博弈完美均衡。具体而言，我们识别了信号策略相较于不发送任何信号的场景能改善信号发送者最终表现的充分必要条件。此外，我们在这些条件满足时提供了最优信号策略。值得注意的是，我们发现对于某些场景，信号发送者能有效地将其表现翻倍。
英文摘要：
Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General Lotto games, a class of two-player competitive resource allocation models. We consider an asymmetric information setting where the opponent is uncertain about the resource budget of the other player, and holds a prior belief on its value. We assume the other player, called the signaler, is able to send a noisy signal about its budget to the opponent. With its updated belief, the opponent then must decide to invest in costly resources that it will deploy against the signaler's resource budget in a General Lotto game. We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium to this extensive-form game. In particular, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for which a signaling policy improves the signaler's resulting performance in comparison to the scenario where it does not send any signal. Moreover, we provide the optimal signaling policy when these conditions are met. Notably we find that for some scenarios, the signaler can effectively double its performance.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
