arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2009.12903cs.GT
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信号的力量及其与无政府状态无政府代价的内在联系

The Power of Signaling and its Intrinsic Connection to the Price of Anarchy

James Nachbar, Haifeng Xu

摘要:

博弈论的一个基本教训是,战略行为往往会使均衡结果无效。信息设计的最新文献。信号或说服--通过向参与者提供精心调整的信息来影响他们的行动,从而改善均衡。大多数以前的研究都集中在设计最佳信令方案的问题。这项工作从以前的研究出发,考虑一个描述性的问题,并期待定量表征信号的力量(PoS),即,一个信号设计者可以在多大程度上改善她的均衡结果的目标。我们考虑了四种功率递增的信令方案:完全信息、最优公共信令、最优私有信令和最优事前私有信令。我们的主要结果是一个干净的和严格的表征的额外权力,每个信令方案已超过其直接的前任以上在广泛的类成本最小化和收益最大化的游戏,其中:(1)所有的球员最小化非负成本函数或最大化非负收益函数;(2)信令设计者(自然)优化球员的效用之和。我们证明,额外的权力的信号-定义为最坏情况下的比例之间的平衡目标的两个连续的信号方案在上述列表-是有界的,正是由充分研究的概念,相应的游戏的无政府状态的无政府代价。此外,我们证明了所有这些界限是紧的。

英文摘要:

A basic lesson from game theory is that strategic behavior often renders the equilibrium outcome inefficient. The recent literature of information design -- a.k.a. signaling or persuasion -- looks to improve equilibria by providing carefully-tuned information to players in order to influence their actions. Most previous studies have focused on the question of designing optimal signaling schemes. This work departs from previous research by considering a descriptive question and looks to quantitatively characterize the power of signaling (PoS), i.e., how much a signaling designer can improve her objective of the equilibrium outcome. We consider four signaling schemes with increasing power: full information, optimal public signaling, optimal private signaling and optimal ex-ante private signaling. Our main result is a clean and tight characterization of the additional power each signaling scheme has over its immediate predecessor above in the broad classes of cost-minimization and payoff-maximization games where: (1) all players minimize non-negative cost functions or maximize non-negative payoff functions; (2) the signaling designer (naturally) optimizes the sum of players' utilities. We prove that the additional power of signaling -- defined as the worst-case ratio between the equilibrium objectives of two consecutive signaling schemes in the above list -- is bounded precisely by the well-studied notion of the price of anarchy of the corresponding games. Moreover, we show that all these bounds are tight.

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