arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2408.02283cs.GT
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通过对抗团队博弈中的私有信息预分支结构增强均衡求解

Enhanced Equilibria-Solving via Private Information Pre-Branch Structure in Adversarial Team Games

Chen Qiu, Haobo Fu, Kai Li, Weixin Huang, Jiajia Zhang, Xuan Wang

AI总结:

针对对抗团队博弈TMECor求解中转化博弈规模爆炸的问题,提出基于私有信息预分支的博弈转化方法,证明规模指数缩减与均衡等价,并取得最高694.44倍加速。

摘要:

在事前协调的对抗团队博弈(ATGs)中,一个团队与一名对手竞争,且团队成员仅被允许在博弈开始前协调其策略。带相关性的团队-最大最小均衡(TMECor)是适用于ATGs的一种解概念。一类TMECor求解方法将该问题转化为求解两人零和博弈中的NE(纳什均衡),并利用后者成熟的工具。然而,现有方法本质上基于动作,由于转化后博弈规模呈指数增长,导致泛化能力差且求解效率低。为解决上述问题,我们提出一种基于私有信息的高效博弈转化方法,其中所有团队成员由单一协调者表示。我们设计了一种称为私有信息预分支的结构,该结构在决策时考虑来自队友的所有可能私有信息。我们证明,与当前最先进方法相比,我们的方法所转化博弈的规模呈指数级缩小。此外,我们证明了均衡等价性。实验上,在当前最先进方法能够运行的场景中,例如小规模Kuhn扑克和Leduc扑克,我们的方法实现了182.89倍至694.44倍的显著加速。此外,我们的方法适用于更大规模博弈以及私有信息动态变化的博弈,例如Goofspiel。

英文摘要:

In ex ante coordinated adversarial team games (ATGs), a team competes against an adversary, and the team members are only allowed to coordinate their strategies before the game starts. The team-maxmin equilibrium with correlation (TMECor) is a suitable solution concept for ATGs. One class of TMECor-solving methods transforms the problem into solving NE in two-player zero-sum games, leveraging well-established tools for the latter. However, existing methods are fundamentally action-based, resulting in poor generalizability and low solving efficiency due to the exponential growth in the size of the transformed game. To address the above issues, we propose an efficient game transformation method based on private information, where all team members are represented by a single coordinator. We designed a structure called private information pre-branch, which makes decisions considering all possible private information from teammates. We prove that the size of the game transformed by our method is exponentially reduced compared to the current state-of-the-art. Moreover, we demonstrate equilibria equivalence. Experimentally, our method achieves a significant speedup of 182.89$\times$ to 694.44$\times$ in scenarios where the current state-of-the-art method can work, such as small-scale Kuhn poker and Leduc poker. Furthermore, our method is applicable to larger games and those with dynamically changing private information, such as Goofspiel.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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