隐私保护的偏序时间目标纳什均衡综合
Privacy-preserving Nash Equilibrium Synthesis with Partially Ordered Temporal Objectives
AI总结:
本文提出一种通信协议,在双人图博弈中综合纳什均衡,同时保护玩家私有偏序偏好,通过提前停止通信保证隐私,并证明完备性与隐私性,实验验证其有效性。
摘要:
纳什均衡是推理自利智能体的核心解概念。我们研究了图上的双人确定性博弈中纳什均衡的综合问题,其中玩家对时间目标拥有私有的、偏序的偏好。与先前假设偏好为共同知识的工作不同,我们开发了一种在玩家偏好为私有信息的设置下进行均衡综合的通信协议。在该协议中,玩家通过交换关于他们何时能强制实现理想结果的信息来进行通信以综合均衡。我们通过确保协议在足够信息被揭示以暴露玩家偏好之前停止来纳入隐私。我们通过证明当没有玩家停止通信时,协议要么返回一个均衡,要么证明不存在均衡,从而证明了完备性。然后我们通过证明在停止的情况下,玩家发送的消息总是与多种可能的偏好一致,因此不会揭示关于玩家真实偏好排序的某些给定秘密,从而证明了隐私性。实验表明,我们可以在保护偏好隐私的同时综合非平凡的均衡,突显了该协议在具有受限信息共享的策略综合应用中的潜力。
英文摘要:
Nash equilibrium is a central solution concept for reasoning about self-interested agents. We address the problem of synthesizing Nash equilibria in two-player deterministic games on graphs, where players have private, partially-ordered preferences over temporal goals. Unlike prior work, which assumes preferences are common knowledge, we develop a communication protocol for equilibrium synthesis in settings where players' preferences are private information. In the protocol, players communicate to synthesize equilibria by exchanging information about when they can force desirable outcomes. We incorporate privacy by ensuring the protocol stops before enough information is revealed to expose a player's preferences. We prove completeness by showing that, when no player halts communication, the protocol either returns an equilibrium or certifies that none exists. We then prove privacy by showing that, with stopping, the messages a player sends are always consistent with multiple possible preferences and thus do not reveal some given secret regarding a player's true preference ordering. Experiments demonstrate that we can synthesize non-trivial equilibria while preserving privacy of preferences, highlighting the protocol's potential for applications in strategy synthesis with constrained information sharing.
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