有条件信息披露的承诺博弈
Commitment games with conditional information disclosure
摘要：
相互透明的计算机代理人的条件承诺能力已经在以前的工作承诺游戏和程序平衡。这些文献已经展示了这些能力是如何帮助解决囚徒困境和其他在完全信息环境中的合作失败的。但是，由于私人信息的低效率一直被忽视，迄今为止，在这方面的文献，尽管事实上，这些问题是普遍存在的，也可以通过更大的相互透明度来解决。在这项工作中，我们介绍了一种新的有条件的承诺设备，代理人可以使用有条件地披露私人信息的承诺游戏的框架。我们证明了一个民间定理，为事后效率提供了充分的条件，从而代表了一个理想的代理之间的合作模式，没有第三方调解人。将我们的框架与文献战略信息披露，我们探讨的情况下，有条件的披露可以用来实现充分的合作，而无条件的披露不能。最后，扩展以前的工作程序均衡，我们开发了一个实施条件信息披露。我们表明，这种实现形式的程序$ε$ -贝叶斯纳什均衡对应于这些承诺游戏的贝叶斯纳什均衡。
英文摘要：
The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas and other failures of cooperation in complete information settings. But inefficiencies due to private information have been neglected thus far in this literature, despite the fact that these problems are pervasive and might also be addressed by greater mutual transparency. In this work, we introduce a framework for commitment games with a new kind of conditional commitment device, which agents can use to conditionally disclose private information. We prove a folk theorem for this setting that provides sufficient conditions for ex post efficiency, and thus represents a model of ideal cooperation between agents without a third-party mediator. Connecting our framework with the literature on strategic information revelation, we explore cases where conditional disclosure can be used to achieve full cooperation while unconditional disclosure cannot. Finally, extending previous work on program equilibrium, we develop an implementation of conditional information disclosure. We show that this implementation forms program $ε$-Bayesian Nash equilibria corresponding to the Bayesian Nash equilibria of these commitment games.
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