AI 中文总结
研究以太坊升级中从PBS到ePBS的转变对区块构建微观结构的影响，通过不完全信息两阶段拍卖建模，结合均衡特征与无悔学习，揭示ePBS的棘轮效应，提出TEE边车机制，可提高提议者收益约25%。
AI 中文摘要
以太坊的Glamsterdam升级引入了既定的提议者-构建者分离（ePBS），用向提议者的直接构建者出价取代了以中继为中心的PBS。我们通过一个具有可验证消息的一般不完全信息两阶段拍卖来研究这种转变如何改变区块构建的微观结构，其中早期出价既作为价格报价又作为信号。PBS和ePBS被建模为同一区块构建博弈的限制：PBS外生地固定停止和披露，而ePBS让提议者在事后选择停止和披露。延迟异质性通过不对称信息更新来捕捉：快速构建者在重新出价前观察已披露的早期信息，而慢速构建者则不观察。我们将可处理情况下的精确完美贝叶斯均衡特征与有限博弈中的校准无悔学习相结合。对于PBS，我们表明分离均衡保留了标准的首价拍卖收益基准并提供了其存在的条件。对于ePBS，我们证明了一种棘轮效应：由于提议者可以推迟区块提议并在第二阶段使用早期出价信息，构建者预期事后提取并压低或汇集早期出价，产生分配低效率和收益效率低谷。我们将这种棘轮扭曲解释为一种承诺失败。在完全承诺下，最优政策退化为静态迈尔森拍卖并消除棘轮渠道。为了在可行机制中实现部分这种承诺优势，我们提出了一个可信执行环境（TEE）边车，它强制执行有限承诺。我们将收益最大化的TEE机制表述为一个双线性优化问题。在保守的有限基准中，TEE设计相对于首价基准将提议者收益提高了约25%。
英文摘要
Ethereum's Glamsterdam upgrade introduces enshrined proposer-builder separation (ePBS), replacing relay-centric PBS with direct builder bids to proposers. We study how this shift changes the block-building microstructure through a general imperfect-information two-stage auction with verifiable messages, where an early bid serves as both a price offer and a signal. PBS and ePBS are modeled as restrictions of the same block-building game: PBS fixes stopping and disclosure exogenously, while ePBS lets the proposer choose stopping and disclosure ex post. Latency heterogeneity is captured by asymmetric information updates: fast builders observe disclosed early information before rebidding, while slow builders do not. We combine exact perfect Bayesian equilibrium characterizations in tractable cases with calibrated no-regret learning in finite games. For PBS, we show that separating equilibria preserve the standard first-price-auction payoff benchmark and provide conditions for their existence. For ePBS, we demonstrate a ratchet effect: because the proposer can defer block proposal and use early bid information in the second stage, builders anticipate ex-post extraction and shade or pool early bids, generating allocation inefficiency and revenue-efficiency valleys. We interpret this ratchet distortion as a commitment failure. Under full commitment, the optimal policy collapses to the static Myerson auction and removes the ratchet channel. To realize part of this commitment advantage in a feasible mechanism, we propose a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) sidecar that enforces limited commitment. We formulate the revenue-maximizing TEE mechanism as a bilinear optimization problem. In conservative finite benchmarks, the TEE design increases the proposer revenue relative to the first-price benchmark by approximately \(25\%\).
Comments86 pages, 15 figures
