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arXiv 2403.20161cs.GTcs.MA
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非合作资源竞争贡献博弈中纳什均衡的存在性与验证

Existence and Verification of Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Contribution Games with Resource Contention

Gran Sasso Science Institute(格兰萨索科学研究所)

Nicolas Troquard

AI总结:

本研究探讨非合作资源贡献博弈中资源竞争下纳什均衡的存在性与验证问题,发现竞争厌恶时判定更难,并确定了一类可处理且必有均衡的自然博弈。

摘要:

在资源贡献博弈中,这是一类非合作博弈,参与者希望获得一组资源,并且他们拥有资源包,可以将这些资源包中的资源贡献到一个公共池中供所有人使用。可用的资源随后可以被用于实现他们的私人目标。当参与者的资源包可以从已贡献的资源中提取出来时,该参与者可能对贡献资源的配置感到满意。当可能满意的参与者实际上无法全部获得他们的资源包时,就会发生资源竞争。参与者的偏好总是单一目标的(他们认为一个配置好或不好)且节俭的(在两个同样好的配置之间,他们偏好贡献较少的那个)。一个贡献资源的配置对参与者来说是否好,取决于他们对资源竞争的态度。我们研究了对于三种参与者对资源竞争的态度,判定一个结果是否为纯纳什均衡的问题:公共竞争厌恶、私人竞争厌恶和竞争容忍。特别地,我们证明了在一般情况下,当参与者是竞争厌恶时,该问题比他们竞争容忍时更难。然后,我们确定了一类自然的博弈,在其中存在竞争厌恶偏好时,该问题变得可处理,并且总是存在纳什均衡。

英文摘要:

In resource contribution games, a class of non-cooperative games, the players want to obtain a bundle of resources and are endowed with bags of bundles of resources that they can make available into a common for all to enjoy. Available resources can then be used towards their private goals. A player is potentially satisfied with a profile of contributed resources when his bundle could be extracted from the contributed resources. Resource contention occurs when the players who are potentially satisfied, cannot actually all obtain their bundle. The player's preferences are always single-minded (they consider a profile good or they do not) and parsimonious (between two profiles that are equally good, they prefer the profile where they contribute less). What makes a profile of contributed resources good for a player depends on their attitude towards resource contention. We study the problem of deciding whether an outcome is a pure Nash equilibrium for three kinds of players' attitudes towards resource contention: public contention-aversity, private contention-aversity, and contention-tolerance. In particular, we demonstrate that in the general case when the players are contention-averse, then the problem is harder than when they are contention-tolerant. We then identify a natural class of games where, in presence of contention-averse preferences, it becomes tractable, and where there is always a Nash equilibrium.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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