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arXiv 2104.11298cs.GT
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任意测度空间上多人Colonel Blotto对策的Nash均衡

Nash Equilibria of The Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Game on Arbitrary Measure Spaces

Siddhartha Jayanti

摘要:

博雷尔在1921年提出的布洛托上校问题是社会科学中一个广泛适用的无约束同时赢者通吃竞争模型。应用包括选举、广告、研发等。然而,经典的Blotto问题和变种限制了研究的竞争在一组有限的离散战场。本文将经典理论推广到研究任意可测战场上的多人Blotto博弈,给出了一个有效的对称“可均分”广义Blotto博弈平衡点抽样算法,并刻画了单位区间上Blotto博弈的对称公平平衡点.

英文摘要:

The Colonel Blotto Problem proposed by Borel in 1921 has served as a widely applicable model of budget-constrained simultaneous winner-take-all competitions in the social sciences. Applications include elections, advertising, R&D and more. However, the classic Blotto problem and variants limit the study to competitions over a finite set of discrete battlefields. In this paper, we extend the classical theory to study multiplayer Blotto games over arbitrary measurable battlegrounds, provide an algorithm to efficiently sample equilibria of symmetric "equipartionable" Generalized Blotto games, and characterize the symmetric fair equilibria of the Blotto game over the unit interval.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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