发表机构
Brigham Young University; University of Colorado, Colorado Springs（杨百翰大学; 科罗拉多大学斯普林斯分校）
机构由 AI 辅助整理，请以论文原文为准。AI 中文总结
本研究探讨威慑的Colonel Blotto模型中不同信息结构对士兵叛变决策、博弈均衡及期望效用的影响，并证明兵力比例与俘获概率阈值可指导信息设计。
AI 中文摘要
在战略互动中，威慑是一种结果，即一方激励另一方不参与。这一概念可应用于两位将军之间的Colonel Blotto博弈，其中士兵可能因对方将军的行动而被威慑，从而不服从命令。在此设定下，威慑不仅取决于将军如何分配兵力，还取决于士兵在决定服从命令或叛变时所能获得的信息。在本工作中，我们研究了多种信息结构下的双战场Colonel Blotto威慑模型，这些信息结构涵盖从仅基于总体信息做出决策到观察局部战场条件后做出决策的各种情形。我们展示了不同的信息结构如何改变所诱导博弈的结构，影响均衡的存在性，并显著改变期望效用。我们的研究结果还证明，每位将军可支配的兵力比例结合一个俘获概率阈值，足以告知将军们他们希望其士兵能够获取何种信息。
英文摘要
In strategic interactions, deterrence is an outcome where one party incentivizes the other party to not participate. This concept can be applied to Colonel Blotto games between two generals where troops can be deterred from following orders by the actions of the opposing general. In this setting, deterrence depends not only on how generals allocate troops, but also on the information available to troops when they decide whether to follow orders or defect. In this work, we study a two-battlefield Colonel Blotto model of deterrence under multiple information structures, ranging from decisions made with only aggregate information to decisions made after local battlefield conditions are observed. We show how different information structures alter the structure of the induced game, affect the existence of equilibria, and substantially change expected utilities. Our findings also prove that the ratio of troops available to each general combined with a capture probability threshold is enough to inform generals about what information they want their troops to have access to.
