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arXiv 1905.04154cs.GTcs.SYeess.SY
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非平稳均场博弈中的马尔可夫完美均衡

Markov perfect equilibria in non-stationary mean-field games

University of Texas, Austin(德克萨斯大学奥斯汀分校)

Deepanshu Vasal

AI总结:

本文研究了有限和无限时间 horizon 折扣动态均场博弈中的非平稳群体状态动态,提出了一种新的递归算法来计算依赖于玩家私人类型和当前动态群体状态的马尔可夫完美均衡,并应用该算法研究了网络系统安全问题。

摘要:

在本文中,我们考虑了有限和无限时间 horizon 折扣动态均场博弈,其中存在一个由同质玩家组成的大型群体,这些玩家依次做出战略决策,每个玩家通过群体状态受到其他玩家的影响。每个玩家有一个私人类型,只有她自己可以观察到。此类博弈在文献中通常在简化假设下研究,即群体状态动态是平稳的。在本文中,我们考虑非平稳的群体状态动态,并提出了一种新的递归算法来计算依赖于玩家私人类型和当前动态群体状态的马尔可夫完美均衡(MPE)。使用该算法,我们研究了网络系统中的安全问题,其中被感染的节点对系统产生负外部性,每个节点决定是否接种疫苗。我们数值计算了该博弈的MPE。

英文摘要:

In this paper, we consider both finite and infinite horizon discounted dynamic mean-field games where there is a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players through an aggregate population state. Each player has a private type that only she observes. Such games have been studied in the literature under simplifying assumption that population state dynamics are stationary. In this paper, we consider non-stationary population state dynamics and present a novel backward recursive algorithm to compute Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) that depend on both, a player's private type, and current (dynamic) population state. Using this algorithm, we study a security problem in cyberphysical system where infected nodes put negative externality on the system, and each node makes a decision to get vaccinated. We numerically compute MPE of the game.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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