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arXiv 1612.01402cs.GT
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关于弱子对策完美均衡的存在性

On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria

Véronique Bruyère, Stéphane Le Roux, Arno Pauly, Jean-François Raskin

摘要:

我们研究多玩家回合制游戏(潜在无限)有向图。游戏的每一局都有一个结果。每个玩家都有一个偏好关系的结果,使他能够比较发挥。我们专注于最近引入的概念弱子博弈完美均衡(弱SPE)。这是经典SPE概念的一个变体,在经典SPE概念中,偏离的参与者只能在有限数量的历史中使用偏离其初始策略的策略。在游戏中有一个SPE意味着有一个弱SPE,但相反通常是错误的。我们提出了一般条件的游戏图的结构和玩家的偏好关系,保证存在一个弱SPE,这另外是有限的记忆。从这个一般性的结果,我们得到两大类游戏,总是存在一个弱SPE:(i)游戏与有限范围的结果函数,和(ii)游戏与有限的底层图和前缀独立的结果函数。对于第二类,我们确定条件的偏好关系,保证弱SPE的无记忆策略。

英文摘要:

We study multi-player turn-based games played on (potentially infinite) directed graphs. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We focus on the recently introduced notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE). This is a variant of the classical notion of SPE, where players who deviate can only use strategies deviating from their initial strategy in a finite number of histories. Having an SPE in a game implies having a weak SPE but the contrary is generally false. We propose general conditions on the structure of the game graph and on the preference relations of the players that guarantee the existence of a weak SPE, that additionally is finite-memory. From this general result, we derive two large classes of games for which there always exists a weak SPE: (i) the games with a finite-range outcome function, and (ii) the games with a finite underlying graph and a prefix-independent outcome function. For the second class, we identify conditions on the preference relations that guarantee memoryless strategies for the weak SPE.

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