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arXiv 1408.1233cs.GTcs.CC
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n人完全回忆扩充型对策(拟)完美均衡的计算复杂性

The complexity of computing a (quasi-)perfect equilibrium for an n-player extensive form game of perfect recall

Kousha Etessami

摘要:

研究了有限n人完全回忆扩展型博弈(EFGPR)的纳什均衡的计算或近似精化的复杂性,其中n >= 3。我们的结果适用于一些研究完善,包括顺序(SE),扩展形式完美(PE),和准完美平衡(QPE)。这些改进了纳什均衡和子博弈完美均衡。其中,最精细的概念是PE和QPE。根据经典的结果,所有这些平衡点都存在于任何EFGPR中。我们表明,对于所有这些概念的平衡,近似一个给定的EFGPR的平衡,在给定的期望精度,是FIXP_a-完全的。我们还考虑了相应的“几乎”均衡概念的复杂性,并表明它们是PPAD完备的。特别地,我们定义了“delta几乎完全(准)完美”均衡,并证明了计算一个是PPAD完全的。我们表明,这些概念细化“三角洲几乎子博弈完美均衡”EFGPR,这是PPAD完成。因此,对于n个参与者EFGPR(n >= 3),近似一个这样的(delta-几乎)均衡是P-时间等价于近似具有3个或更多参与者的范式博弈(NFG)的(delta-几乎)NE。NFG可被平凡地编码为EFGPR,而不会在大小上爆炸。因此,我们的研究结果扩展了著名的复杂性结果NFG的平衡在更一般的设置EFGPR的改进。对于2人EFGPR,类似的复杂度结果来自Koller,Megiddo和von Stengel(1996),von Stengel,van den Elzen和Talman(2002)以及Miltersen和Soerensen(2010)的算法。对于n人EFGPR,Daskalakis,Fabrikant和Papadimitriou(2006)给出了纳什和子博弈完美均衡的类似结果。然而,没有类似的结果是已知的更精细的概念的均衡EFGPR与3个或更多的球员。

英文摘要:

We study the complexity of computing or approximating refinements of Nash equilibrium for a given finite n-player extensive form game of perfect recall (EFGPR), where n >= 3. Our results apply to a number of well-studied refinements, including sequential (SE), extensive-form perfect (PE), and quasi-perfect equilibrium (QPE). These refine Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium. Of these, the most refined notions are PE and QPE. By classic results, all these equilibria exist in any EFGPR. We show that, for all these notions of equilibrium, approximating an equilibrium for a given EFGPR, to within a given desired precision, is FIXP_a-complete. We also consider the complexity of corresponding "almost" equilibrium notions, and show that they are PPAD-complete. In particular, we define "delta-almost epsilon-(quasi-)perfect" equilibrium, and show computing one is PPAD-complete. We show these notions refine "delta-almost subgame-perfect equilibrium" for EFGPRs, which is PPAD-complete. Thus, approximating one such (delta-almost) equilibrium for n-player EFGPRs, n >= 3, is P-time equivalent to approximating a (delta-almost) NE for a normal form game (NFG) with 3 or more players. NFGs are trivially encodable as EFGPRs without blowup in size. Thus our results extend the celebrated complexity results for NFGs to refinements of equilibrium in the more general setting of EFGPRs. For 2-player EFGPRs, analogous complexity results follow from the algorithms of Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel (1996), von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2002), and Miltersen and Soerensen (2010). For n-player EFGPRs, an analogous result for Nash and subgame-perfect equilibrium was given by Daskalakis, Fabrikant, and Papadimitriou (2006). However, no analogous results were known for the more refined notions of equilibrium for EFGPRs with 3 or more players.

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