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arXiv 1606.07521cs.GT
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动态完全信息博弈中局中人是否采用前向归纳推理?

Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?

Sujata Ghosh, Aviad Heifetz, Rineke Verbrugge

摘要:

我们进行了一项实验,参与者与计算机进行完全信息游戏,计算机在游戏开始时经常偏离其逆向归纳策略。参与者知道,在每一场比赛中,计算机仍然在根据参与者未来策略的一些信念进行优化。结果表明,总的来说,参与者可能会以一种最优的方式做出反应,这种方式与他们的最佳合理化扩展形式合理化猜想有关--也就是说,计算机追求的奖品比它放弃的奖品更大,即使这必然意味着计算机在游戏中迈出第一步时将未来的非理性归因于参与者。因此,似乎参与者采用了前瞻性归纳法。然而,对于大多数参与者的选择,存在其他的解释;例如,选择可以基于参与者在游戏剩余时间内归因于计算机的风险规避程度,而不是计算机在游戏开始时已经放弃的沉没外部选项。由于这个原因,实验的结果还没有为参与者的前向归纳推理提供决定性的证据。

英文摘要:

We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game, the computer was nevertheless optimizing against some belief about the participant's future strategy. It turned out that in the aggregate, participants were likely to respond in a way which is optimal with respect to their best-rationalization extensive form rationalizability conjecture - namely the conjecture that the computer is after a larger prize than the one it has foregone, even when this necessarily meant that the computer has attributed future irrationality to the participant when the computer made the first move in the game. Thus, it appeared that participants applied forward induction. However, there exist alternative explanations for the choices of most participants; for example, choices could be based on the extent of risk aversion that participants attributed to the computer in the remainder of the game, rather than to the sunk outside option that the computer has already foregone at the beginning of the game. For this reason, the results of the experiment do not yet provide conclusive evidence for Forward Induction reasoning on the part of the participants.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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