We study multiplayer turn-based timed games with reachability objectives. In particular, we are interested in the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). We prove that deciding the constrained existence of an SPE in this setting is EXPTIME-complete.
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model showed that Nash equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are guaranteed to exist in the multiplayer (resp. two-player) case. The existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case remained and is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus our study on the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium well-suited in the framewo…
We study $n$-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also study natural variants of SPE, named weak (resp. very weak) SPE, where players who deviate cannot use the full class of strategies but only a subclass with a finite number of (resp. a unique) deviation step(s). Our results are threefold. Firstly, we c…
Weighted timed games are played by two players on a timed automaton equipped with weights: one player wants to minimise the accumulated weight while reaching a target, while the other has an opposite objective. Used in a reactive synthesis perspective, this quantitative extension of timed games allows one to measure the quality of controllers. Weighted timed games are notoriously difficult and quickly undecidable, even when restricted to non-negative weights. Decidability results exist for subclasses of one-clock games, and for a subclass with non-negative weights defined by a semantical restr…
In a reachability-time game, players Min and Max choose moves so that the time to reach a final state in a timed automaton is minimised or maximised, respectively. Asarin and Maler showed decidability of reachability-time games on strongly non-Zeno timed automata using a value iteration algorithm. This paper complements their work by providing a strategy improvement algorithm for the problem. It also generalizes their decidability result because the proposed strategy improvement algorithm solves reachability-time games on all timed automata. The exact computational complexity of solving reacha…
We study two player reachability-price games on single-clock timed automata. The problem is as follows: given a state of the automaton, determine whether the first player can guarantee reaching one of the designated goal locations. If a goal location can be reached then we also want to compute the optimum price of doing so. Our contribution is twofold. First, we develop a theory of cost functions, which provide a comprehensive methodology for the analysis of this problem. This theory allows us to establish our second contribution, an EXPTIME algorithm for computing the optimum reachability pri…
Priced timed games (PTGs) are two-player zero-sum games played on the infinite graph of configurations of priced timed automata where two players take turns to choose transitions in order to optimize cost to reach target states. Bouyer et al. and Alur, Bernadsky, and Madhusudan independently proposed algorithms to solve PTGs with nonnegative prices under certain divergence restriction over prices. Brihaye, Bruyere, and Raskin later provided a justification for such a restriction by showing the undecidability of the optimal strategy synthesis problem in the absence of this divergence restrictio…
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). But sometimes several equilibria may coexist such that in one equilibrium no player reaches his target set whereas in another one several players reach it. It is thus very natural to identify "relevant" equilibria. In this paper, we consider different notions of relevant equilibria including Pareto optimal equilibria and equilibria with high soc…
We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we focus on the recent notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE), a refinement of SPE. In this setting, players who deviate can only use the subclass of strategies that differ from the original one on a finite number of histories. We are interested in the constrained existence problem for weak SPEs. We provide a complete characterization o…
We study multiplayer turn-based games played on a finite directed graph such that each player aims at satisfying an omega-regular Boolean objective. Instead of the well-known notions of Nash equilibrium (NE) and subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), we focus on the recent notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE), a refinement of SPE. In this setting, players who deviate can only use the subclass of strategies that differ from the original one on a finite number of histories. We are interested in the constrained existence problem for weak SPEs. We provide a complete characterization o…
An average-time game is played on the infinite graph of configurations of a finite timed automaton. The two players, Min and Max, construct an infinite run of the automaton by taking turns to perform a timed transition. Player Min wants to minimise the average time per transition and player Max wants to maximise it. A solution of average-time games is presented using a reduction to average-price game on a finite graph. A direct consequence is an elementary proof of determinacy for average-time games. This complements our results for reachability-time games and partially solves a problem posed …
Two-player zero-sum games are a well-established model for synthesising controllers that optimise some performance criterion. In such games one player represents the controller, while the other describes the (adversarial) environment, and controller synthesis corresponds to computing the optimal strategies of the controller for a given criterion. Asarin and Maler initiated the study of quantitative games on (non-probabilistic) timed automata by synthesising controllers which optimise the time to reach a final state. The correctness and termination of their approach was dependent on exploiting …
In this paper, we consider reachability games over general hybrid systems, and distinguish between two possible observation frameworks for those games: either the precise dynamics of the system is seen by the players (this is the perfect observation framework), or only the starting point and the delays are known by the players (this is the partial observation framework). In the first more classical framework, we show that time-abstract bisimulation is not adequate for solving this problem, although it is sufficient in the case of timed automata . That is why we consider an other equivalence, n…