动态网络上的权力分配博弈：子博弈完善
The Power Allocation Game on Dynamic Networks: Subgame Perfection
摘要：
在博弈论文献中，对于具有无限策略空间和不连续效用函数的正规型博弈的均衡选择，似乎很少有研究。此外，许多现有的选择方法不适用于涉及合作和非合作场景的游戏（例如，“games on signed graphs”）。以均衡选择为目的，将\cite{allocation}中的权力分配博弈（符号图上的静态资源分配博弈）转化为扩展形式。给出了扩展型博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡的结果。这似乎是第一次，基于时变图的子博弈完美用于网络游戏中的均衡选择。本文提出的子博弈完美性的思想可以推广到其他网络博弈中，并以拥塞博弈为例进行说明。
英文摘要：
In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not applicable to games involving both cooperative and noncooperative scenarios (e.g., "games on signed graphs"). With the purpose of equilibrium selection, the power allocation game developed in \cite{allocation}, which is a static, resource allocation game on signed graphs, will be reformulated into an extensive form. Results about the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the extensive-form game will be given. This appears to be the first time that subgame perfection based on time-varying graphs is used for equilibrium selection in network games. This idea of subgame perfection proposed in the paper may be extrapolated to other network games, which will be illustrated with a simple example of congestion games.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
