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arXiv 1409.3062cs.GTcs.DM
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重复销售中的完全贝叶斯均衡

Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Repeated Sales

Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Peres, Balasubramanian Sivan

摘要:

迈尔森经典结果的一个特例描述了当卖方向买方提供单一商品时的收入最优均衡。我们研究了这个模型的重复销售扩展:卖家每天通过发布价格向同一个买家出售一个新的商品副本。购买者对该物品的私人价值最初是从一个公知的分发$F$中得出的,并且自始至终保持不变。这个游戏的一个关键方面是,卖方可能会尝试学习买方的私人价值,以提取更多的收入,而买方的动机是隐藏it.We研究完美贝叶斯均衡(PBE)在这种设置与不同水平的承诺权力的卖方。我们发现,卖方有承诺的权力,不提高价格后购买显着提高收入的PBE。

英文摘要:

A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to the same buyer every day via a posted price. The buyer's private value for the item is drawn initially from a publicly known distribution $F$ and remains the same throughout. A key aspect of this game is that the seller might try to learn the buyer's private value to extract more revenue, while the buyer is motivated to hide it. We study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in this setting with varying levels of commitment power to the seller. We find that the seller having the commitment power to not raise prices subsequent to a purchase significantly improves revenue in a PBE.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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