A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to the same buyer every day via a posted price. The buyer's private value for the item is drawn initially from a publicly known distribution $F$ and remains the same throughout. A key aspect of this game is that the seller might try to learn the buyer's private value to extract more revenue, while the buyer is motivated to hide it. We study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) in this setting with varying levels of commitment power to the seller. We find that the seller having the commitment power to not raise prices subsequent to a purchase significantly improves revenue in a PBE.
Characterisation of reactive Nash equilibria in repeated additive games
Interdisciplinary Transformation University, Linz, Austria(林茨跨学科转型大学);RIKEN Center for Computational Science, Kobe, Japan(日本神户理化学研究所计算科学中心);RIKEN Center for Interdisciplinary Theoretical and Mathematical Science (iTHEMS), Wako, Japan(日本和光理化学研究所交叉理论与数学科学中心)
Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games
SYCAMORE Lab, EPFL - Swiss Federal Technology Institute of Lausanne(洛桑联邦理工学院 S Y C A M O R E 实验室);Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics and Political Science(伦敦政治经济学院数学系);Department of Quantitative Methods, CUNEF Universidad(CUNEF 大学定量方法系)