arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1305.0085cs.GT
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私人销售的公共物品定价

Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale

Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme

摘要:

我们考虑卖方所面临的定价问题,卖方给一种商品定价,不仅使买方受益,而且使周围的其他人受益。例如,吹雪机不仅对购买它的家庭有用,而且对同一条街上的其他人也有用。既然卖方被限制通过个人私人销售来销售这样一种(本地的)公共产品,那么他应该如何根据代理人持有的价值分配来定价呢?我们把这个问题看作一个两阶段博弈。在第一阶段,卖方选择并宣布产品的价格。在第二阶段,代理人(每个人都有一个私人价值的商品)同时决定他们是否会购买产品。在由此产生的博弈中,可以表现出多重均衡,代理人必须制定策略,决定他们是否会自己购买商品以获得其利益。在一个完全公共产品的情况下(当任何代理人购买时,所有代理人都受益),我们描述了一种定价机制,当价值从一个定期分布中提取时,它近似于收入最优(直到一个常数因子)。然后,我们研究的设置中,好的是只有“本地”公共:代理人安排在一个网络中,只与他们的邻居分享利益。我们描述了一种定价方法,近似最大化收入,在最坏的情况下,代理行为的均衡,任何$d$定期网络。最后,我们表明,近似最优的价格可以找到一般网络的特殊情况下,私人价值是从一个均匀分布。我们还讨论了将这些结果扩展到一般网络和正则分布的一些障碍。

英文摘要:

We consider the pricing problem faced by a seller who assigns a price to a good that confers its benefits not only to its buyers, but also to other individuals around them. For example, a snow-blower is potentially useful not only to the household that buys it, but also to others on the same street. Given that the seller is constrained to selling such a (locally) public good via individual private sales, how should he set his prices given the distribution of values held by the agents? We study this problem as a two-stage game. In the first stage, the seller chooses and announces a price for the product. In the second stage, the agents (each having a private value for the good) decide simultaneously whether or not they will buy the product. In the resulting game, which can exhibit a multiplicity of equilibria, agents must strategize about whether they will themselves purchase the good to receive its benefits. In the case of a fully public good (where all agents benefit whenever any agent purchases), we describe a pricing mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal (up to a constant factor) when values are drawn from a regular distribution. We then study settings in which the good is only "locally" public: agents are arranged in a network and share benefits only with their neighbors. We describe a pricing method that approximately maximizes revenue, in the worst case over equilibria of agent behavior, for any $d$-regular network. Finally, we show that approximately optimal prices can be found for general networks in the special case that private values are drawn from a uniform distribution. We also discuss some barriers to extending these results to general networks and regular distributions.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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