具有交互式信息获取的随机博弈:流水线完美马尔可夫贝叶斯均衡
Stochastic Game with Interactive Information Acquisition: Pipelined Perfect Markov Bayesian Equilibrium
AI总结:
本文针对带双阶段信息获取与行动结构的多参与者一般和随机博弈,提出融合马尔可夫完美均衡与完美贝叶斯均衡的PPME概念,通过不动点对齐原理给出其可验证充要条件。
摘要:
本文研究一类每周期具备双阶段时间结构的多参与者、一般和随机博弈。智能体对每周期初实现的随时间演化的状态存在不确定性。在第一阶段,智能体开展针对未知状态的信息获取:每个智能体策略性地从多个成本各异的信令选项中做出选择,所选信令规则会发放决定智能体类型的私有信息。在第二阶段,智能体依据自身私有类型采取行动,进行贝叶斯博弈。本文提出了融合马尔可夫完美均衡与完美贝叶斯均衡的均衡概念——流水线完美马尔可夫贝叶斯均衡(PPME),提出了名为不动点对齐的新型均衡刻画原理,并给出了一组可验证的、判定任意策略剖面能否达成PPME的充要条件。
英文摘要:
This paper studies a multi-player, general-sum stochastic game characterized by a dual-stage temporal structure per period. The agents face uncertainty regarding the time-evolving state that is realized at the beginning of each period. During the first stage, agents engage in information acquisition regarding the unknown state. Each agent strategically selects from multiple signaling options, each carrying a distinct cost. The selected signaling rule dispenses private information that determines the type of the agent. In the second stage, the agents play a Bayesian game by taking actions contingent on their private types. We introduce an equilibrium concept, Pipelined Perfect Markov Bayesian Equilibrium (PPME), which incorporates the Markov perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We propose a novel equilibrium characterization principle termed fixed-point alignment and deliver a set of verifiable necessary and sufficient conditions for any strategy profile to achieve PPME.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。