arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2210.11296eess.SYcs.GTcs.SY
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平均场球队和相关类型的比赛

Mean field teams and games with correlated types

Deepanshu Vasal

摘要:

平均场博弈传统上被定义为一种大规模参与者交互的模型,其中每个参与者都有一个独立于参与者的私人类型。在本文中,我们引入了一个新的平均场球队和游戏的\emph{correlated types},有一个大的人口同质的球员顺序作出战略决策,每个球员是通过一个总人口状态的影响,其他球员。每个播放器具有仅她观察的私有类型,并且任何$N$播放器的类型通过内核$Q$相关。所有运动员通常观察到一个相关的平均场群体状态,它代表了任何$N$运动员相关关节类型的经验分布。我们定义平均场团队最优策略(MFTO)为最大化所有参与人的期望联合收益的参与人的策略。我们还定义平均场均衡(MFE)在这样的游戏耦合贝尔曼动态规划向后方程和福克普朗克向前方程的相关平均场状态的解决方案,其中一个球员的策略在MFE取决于两个,她的私人类型和当前的相关平均场人口状态。我们提出了这样的平衡存在的充分条件。我们还提出了一个向后递归的方法相当于大师的方程来计算所有的MFTO和MFE的球队和比赛。该方法的每一步都包括解决团队问题的优化问题和游戏的固定点方程。我们提供了充分的条件,保证存在这个不动点方程的游戏每次$t$。

英文摘要:

Mean field games have traditionally been defined~[1,2] as a model of large scale interaction of players where each player has a private type that is independent across the players. In this paper, we introduce a new model of mean field teams and games with \emph{correlated types} where there are a large population of homogeneous players sequentially making strategic decisions and each player is affected by other players through an aggregate population state. Each player has a private type that only she observes and types of any $N$ players are correlated through a kernel $Q$. All players commonly observe a correlated mean-field population state which represents the empirical distribution of any $N$ players' correlated joint types. We define the Mean-Field Team optimal Strategies (MFTO) as strategies of the players that maximize total expected joint reward of the players. We also define Mean-Field Equilibrium (MFE) in such games as solution of coupled Bellman dynamic programming backward equation and Fokker Planck forward equation of the correlated mean field state, where a player's strategy in an MFE depends on both, her private type and current correlated mean field population state. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of such an equilibria. We also present a backward recursive methodology equivalent of master's equation to compute all MFTO and MFEs of the team and game respectively. Each step in this methodology consists of solving an optimization problem for the team problem and a fixed-point equation for the game. We provide sufficient conditions that guarantee existence of this fixed-point equation for the game for each time $t$.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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