基于公共信息信念的随机零和竞争对策动态规划
Common Information Belief based Dynamic Programs for Stochastic Zero-sum Games with Competing Teams
摘要:
分散的团队问题,球员有关于潜在的随机系统的状态的不对称信息已被积极研究,但这种团队之间的\emph{games}了解较少。我们考虑两个竞争团队之间的零和随机博弈的一般模型。这个模型包含了许多以前考虑的团队和零和博弈模型。对于这个一般模型,我们提供了上限(最小-最大)和下限(最大-最小)的游戏值。此外,如果游戏的上限值和下限值相同(即,如果游戏有一个\emph{value}),我们的边界与游戏的值一致。我们的界限是使用两个动态程序的基础上,充分的统计称为共同信息信念(CIB)。我们还确定了某些信息结构中,只有最小化的团队控制的CIB的演变。在这些情况下,我们表明,我们的CIB为基础的动态程序之一,可以用来找到最小最大的战略(除了最小最大值)。我们提出了一个近似的动态规划的方法来计算值(和战略时,适用),并说明我们的结果与一个例子的帮助。
英文摘要:
Decentralized team problems where players have asymmetric information about the state of the underlying stochastic system have been actively studied, but \emph{games} between such teams are less understood. We consider a general model of zero-sum stochastic games between two competing teams. This model subsumes many previously considered team and zero-sum game models. For this general model, we provide bounds on the upper (min-max) and lower (max-min) values of the game. Furthermore, if the upper and lower values of the game are identical (i.e., if the game has a \emph{value}), our bounds coincide with the value of the game. Our bounds are obtained using two dynamic programs based on a sufficient statistic known as the common information belief (CIB). We also identify certain information structures in which only the minimizing team controls the evolution of the CIB. In these cases, we show that one of our CIB based dynamic programs can be used to find the min-max strategy (in addition to the min-max value). We propose an approximate dynamic programming approach for computing the values (and the strategy when applicable) and illustrate our results with the help of an example.
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