非对称信息下动态决策问题的统一方法--第一部分:非战略主体
A Unified Approach to Dynamic Decision Problems with Asymmetric Information - Part I: Non-Strategic Agents
摘要:
本文研究了一类具有非对称信息和非策略代理的动态多代理决策问题,其中包括动态团队作为特例。当智能体是非策略性的时,一个智能体的策略是其他智能体所知道的。然而,代理人的策略选择和信念是相互依赖的,随着时间的推移,这种现象被称为信号。我们引入了私人信息的概念,有效地压缩代理人的信息在一个相互一致的方式。基于充分信息的概念,我们提出了一个信息状态,为每个代理,是足够的决策目的。我们提出了动态多代理决策问题的实例,我们可以确定每个代理的时不变域的信息状态。此外,我们提出了一个推广的部分观察马尔可夫决策过程(POMDP)的信念的政策独立性的动态多智能体决策问题。在信息不对称的动态团队的背景下,所提出的信息状态集导致一个顺序的分解,随着时间的推移,代理人的策略和信念之间的相互依赖性,并使我们能够制定一个动态的程序,以确定一个全局最优的政策,通过逆向归纳。
英文摘要:
We study a general class of dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information and non-strategic agents, which includes dynamic teams as a special case. When agents are non-strategic, an agent's strategy is known to the other agents. Nevertheless, the agents' strategy choices and beliefs are interdependent over times, a phenomenon known as signaling. We introduce the notions of private information that effectively compresses the agents' information in a mutually consistent manner. Based on the notions of sufficient information, we propose an information state for each agent that is sufficient for decision making purposes. We present instances of dynamic multi-agent decision problems where we can determine an information state with a time-invariant domain for each agent. Furthermore, we present a generalization of the policy-independence property of belief in Partially Observed Markov Decision Processes (POMDP) to dynamic multi-agent decision problems. Within the context of dynamic teams with asymmetric information, the proposed set of information states leads to a sequential decomposition that decouples the interdependence between the agents' strategies and beliefs over time, and enables us to formulate a dynamic program to determine a globally optimal policy via backward induction.
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