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arXiv 2406.00455econ.TH
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分层延迟接受机制下的博弈

Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism

Jiarui Xie

AI总结:

本文研究分层延迟接受机制,证明其不具备策略防操纵性,并揭示合并层级保留均衡结果、层级内无环性是实现稳定匹配的充要条件,同时指出分层未必能提升顶层学校生源质量。

摘要:

我们研究了中国和土耳其等国家在学校招生中使用的分层延迟接受机制。该机制将学校划分为若干层级,并在每个层级内应用延迟接受算法。一旦学生被分配,就不能再申请后续层级的学校。我们证明该机制不具备策略防操纵性。在由此引发的偏好显示博弈中,我们发现合并层级会保留所有均衡结果,而层级内的无环性是该机制实现稳定匹配的充分必要条件。我们还发现,在延迟接受机制中引入分层可能并不会如预期那样提高顶层学校的学生质量。

英文摘要:

We study the tiered deferred acceptance mechanism used in school admissions, such as in China and Turkey. This mechanism partitions schools into tiers and applies the deferred acceptance algorithm within each tier. Once assigned, students cannot apply to schools in subsequent tiers. We show that this mechanism is not strategy-proof. In the induced preference revelation game, we find that merging tiers preserves all equilibrium outcomes, and within-tier acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the mechanism to implement stable matchings. We also find that introducing tiers to the deferred acceptance mechanism may not improve student quality at top-tier schools as intended.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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