We study the tiered deferred acceptance mechanism used in school admissions, such as in China and Turkey. This mechanism partitions schools into tiers and applies the deferred acceptance algorithm within each tier. Once assigned, students cannot apply to schools in subsequent tiers. We show that this mechanism is not strategy-proof. In the induced preference revelation game, we find that merging tiers preserves all equilibrium outcomes, and within-tier acyclicity is necessary and sufficient for the mechanism to implement stable matchings. We also find that introducing tiers to the deferred acceptance mechanism may not improve student quality at top-tier schools as intended.
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is Obviously Strategyproof
我们研究战略简单的稳定匹配机制,其中一方有固定的偏好,称为优先级。具体地说,我们问哪些优先级是这样的,延迟接受(DA)的防策略性可以被无法执行权变推理的智能体识别,即\emph{when is DA obviously strategyproof}(Li,2017)?我们回答这个问题,完全特征化的优先级,使DA明显的防策略(OSP)。这解决了Ashlagi和Gonczarowski,2018年的一个开放问题。我们发现,当DA是OSP,优先级是非循环的(埃尔金,2002年),一个限制性的条件,允许优先级只在两个代理不同的时间,或包含一个非常有限的循环模式,所有的优先级列表是相同的,除了正好两个。我们的结论是,对于稳定匹配机制,可理解性(在OSP的意义上)和表达的优先级之间的张力是非常高的。
Efficiency Adjustments Break the Logarithmic Rank Barrier
Queen’s University Belfast(贝尔法斯特女王大学);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校);Freie Universität Berlin(柏林自由大学);Berlin School of Economics(柏林经济学院)
University of Essex(埃塞克斯大学);Pforzheim University(波茨海姆大学);ZEW(欧洲 Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (莱布尼茨经济研究所));Queen’s University Belfast(贝尔法斯特女王大学)
The Large and Likely Inefficiency of Stable Matching Mechanisms
Queen's University Belfast(贝尔法斯特女王大学);Freie Universität Berlin and Berlin School of Economics(柏林自由大学和柏林经济学院);University of California, Berkeley(加州大学伯克利分校)
Smart Lotteries in School Choice: Ex-ante Pareto-Improvement with Ex-post Stability
UNSW Sydney(新南威尔士大学);ELTE Centre for Economic and Regional Studies(布达佩斯经济区域研究中心);Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University(马斯特里赫特大学数量经济学系);HUN-REN Institute for Computer Science and Control(匈牙利科学院计算机与控制研究所);Budapest University of Technology and Economics(布达佩斯技术与经济大学)
Time-constrained Dynamic Mechanisms for College Admissions
Shanghai International College of Intellectual Property, Tongji University(同济大学上海国际知识产权学院);Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg(哥德堡大学经济学系);Department of Economics, Universidad de Montevideo(蒙得维的亚大学经济学系);Department of Economics, Beijing Normal University(北京师范大学经济学系)