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arXiv 2404.06252cs.GT
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直线上两设施博弈的防策略机制设计与刻画

Design and Characterization of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms for Two-Facility Game on a Line

Pinyan Lu, Zihan Luo, Jialin Zhang

AI总结:

本文研究直线上两设施博弈的确定性防策略机制,精细刻画唯一独裁者机制并提出三类新机制,同时证明依赖预测无法在最坏预测有界的保证下获得次线性近似比。

摘要:

我们关注沿线性空间放置两个设施以为一组智能体提供服务的问题。每个智能体都致力于最小化其位置与最近设施之间的距离。机制是一种将智能体报告的位置映射到设施位置的算法。我们感兴趣的是无金钱、确定性、防策略,并且对社会成本提供有界近似比的机制。刻画具有有界近似比的防策略机制族是一个基础性问题。Fotakis 和 Tzamos 已经证明,针对两设施博弈问题的确定性防策略机制包括具有唯一独裁者的机制以及最左—最右机制。本文中,我们首先对第一类机制给出更精细的刻画。随后,我们揭示三类新的防策略机制,它们展现了该机制族内部结构的复杂性。这有助于我们更完整地认识两设施博弈问题的机制刻画,也可能对理解和求解更一般的设施分配博弈问题具有价值。此外,基于我们的精细刻画,我们意外发现,在两设施博弈问题中,预测并不能有效改善机制的性能,而这种用于克服较差近似比的方法在许多其他机制设计问题中是有效的。我们表明,如果要求机制在预测任意糟糕时仍具有有界近似比,那么与此同时,即使拥有完美预测,该机制也绝不可能达到次线性近似比。

英文摘要:

We focus on the problem of placing two facilities along a linear space to serve a group of agents. Each agent is committed to minimizing the distance between her location and the closest facility. A mechanism is an algorithm that maps the reported agent locations to the facility locations. We are interested in mechanisms without money that are deterministic, strategy-proof, and provide a bounded approximation ratio for social cost. It is a fundamental problem to characterize the family of strategy-proof mechanisms with a bounded approximation ratio. Fotakis and Tzamos already demonstrated that the deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms for the 2-facility game problem are mechanisms with a unique dictator and the leftmost-rightmost mechanism. In this paper, we first present a more refined characterization of the first family. We then reveal three new classes of strategy-proof mechanisms that show the intricacy of structure within this family. This helps us get a more complete picture of the characterization of the 2-facility game problem, and may also have value in understanding and solving more general facility allocation game problems. Besides, based on our refined characterization, we surprisingly find that prediction cannot effectively improve the performance of the mechanism in the two-facility game problem, while this methodology to overcome bad approximation ratio works in many other mechanism design problems. We show that if we require that the mechanism admits a bounded approximation ratio when the prediction is arbitrarily bad, then at the same time, the mechanism can never achieve sublinear approximation ratios even with perfect prediction.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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