Euclidean和Manhattan空间中设施选址的策略证明机制
Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location in Euclidean and Manhattan Space
摘要:
我们研究了从一维移动到两个(或更多)维度和欧几里得或曼哈顿距离的设施位置的机制的影响。我们考虑三个基本的公理性质:匿名性,这是一个基本的公平性,帕累托最优性,这是最重要的效率属性之一,和策略证明,确保代理没有动机误报。我们还考虑如何以及这样的机制可以近似的最优福利。我们的结果有些负面。从一维到二维(或更多维)的移动通常会使这些公理性质更难以实现。例如,在欧几里得空间中有两个设施或在曼哈顿空间中只有一个设施,没有机制是匿名的,帕累托最优的和策略证明。相反,线上的机制存在所有三个属性。我们还表明,近似比可能会增加时,移动到两个(或更多)维。我们所有的不可能结果都是最小的。如果我们放弃三个公理之一(匿名性,帕累托最优性或策略证明性),多个机制满足其他两个公理。
英文摘要:
We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.
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