arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 2305.01413physics.soc-ph
收藏

信任还是不信任:非对称N人信任博弈的演化动力学

To Trust or Not to Trust: Evolutionary Dynamics of an Asymmetric N-player Trust Game

Ik Soo Lim, Naoki Masuda

AI总结:

本文提出一种非对称多人信任博弈模型,允许投资者选择不信任并禁止跨角色模仿,研究发现收益函数非线性及机构激励金额影响演化动力学,且给予受托人激励能有效促进自利玩家间的信任。

摘要:

信任他人以及以值得信任的行动回报所受信任,是经济和社会互动的基础。信任博弈(TG)被广泛用于研究信任和可信赖性,它包含两名玩家(一名投资者和一名受托人)之间的序贯互动。它要求投资者至少拥有两种策略或选择(例如,信任受托人与不信任受托人)。根据演化博弈论,反社会策略(例如不信任)的演化会导致投资者和受托人最终获得的收益低于他们采用亲社会策略(例如信任)时所能获得的收益。最近有人提出了将TG推广到多人(即超过两名玩家)TG的方案。然而,其结果取决于两个假设,而各种现实情况可能与之存在实质性偏离:(i)投资者被迫信任受托人,以及(ii)投资者可以通过模仿转变为受托人,反之亦然。我们提出了一种非对称多人TG,允许投资者选择不信任,并禁止不同角色玩家之间的模仿;相反,投资者向其他投资者学习,受托人亦同理。我们表明,所提出TG的演化博弈动力学在定性上取决于收益函数的非线性,以及机构从玩家处收集并分配给玩家的激励金额。我们还表明,给予受托人的激励是有用的且足够的,能以具有成本效益的方式在自利玩家中促进信任和可信赖性。

英文摘要:

Trusting others and reciprocating the received trust with trustworthy actions are fundaments of economic and social interactions. The trust game (TG) is widely used for studying trust and trustworthiness and entails a sequential interaction between two players, an investor and a trustee. It requires at least two strategies or options for an investor (e.g. to trust versus not to trust a trustee). According to the evolutionary game theory, the antisocial strategies (e.g. not to trust) evolve such that the investor and trustee end up with lower payoffs than those that they would get with the prosocial strategies (e.g.to trust). A generalisation of the TG to a multiplayer (i.e.more than two players) TG was recently proposed. However, its outcomes hinge upon two assumptions that various real situations may substantially deviate from: (i) investors are forced to trust trustees and (ii) investors can turn into trustees by imitation and vice versa. We propose an asymmetric multiplayer TG that allows investors not to trust and prohibits the imitation between players of different roles; instead, investors learn from other investors and the same for trustees. We show that the evolutionary game dynamics of the proposed TG qualitatively depends on the nonlinearity of the payoff function and the amount of incentives collected from and distributed to players through an institution. We also show that incentives given to trustees can be useful and sufficient to cost-effectively promote trust and trustworthiness among self-interested players.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑