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arXiv 1008.1063q-bio.PEcond-mat.stat-mechphysics.bio-phphysics.soc-ph
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两两集体策略更新的空间演化博弈中的排序

Ordering in spatial evolutionary games for pairwise collective strategy updates

Gyorgy Szabo, Attila Szolnoki, Melinda Varga, Livia Hanusovszky

摘要:

演化$2 \times 2$游戏的研究与球员位于一个正方形格子。在进化过程中,随机选择的相邻参与者试图通过采用随机策略对来最大化他们的集体收益,该随机策略对的概率取决于他们在最终状态和初始状态之间的总收益之差,假设他们的邻居中存在淬灭策略。在反协调博弈的情况下,该系统的行为类似于反铁磁动力学伊辛模型。在一个广泛的区域内的社会困境,这一动态规则支持形成类似的空间安排的合作者和叛逃者,确保最佳的总收益,如果诱惑选择叛逃超过一个阈值依赖于吸盘的收益。与成对模仿和近视策略更新的结果进行比较,表明了成对集体策略更新在维持合作方面的相关优势。

英文摘要:

Evolutionary $2 \times 2$ games are studied with players located on a square lattice. During the evolution the randomly chosen neighboring players try to maximize their collective income by adopting a random strategy pair with a probability dependent on the difference of their summed payoffs between the final and initial state assuming quenched strategies in their neighborhood. In the case of the anti-coordination game this system behaves alike an anti-ferromagnetic kinetic Ising model. Within a wide region of social dilemmas this dynamical rule supports the formation of similar spatial arrangement of the cooperators and defectors ensuring the optimum total payoff if the temptation to choose defection exceeds a threshold value dependent on the sucker's payoff. The comparison of the results with those achieved for pairwise imitation and myopic strategy updates has indicated the relevant advantage of pairwise collective strategy update in the maintenance of cooperation.

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